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
USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1750

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 10, October 1982



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POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION THEME: FORMING THE COMMUNIST WORLD VIEW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 3-10

[Editorial: "The Forming of a Communist Ideology--The Core of Ideological Work in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] For more than six decades now, the Soviet people, as was pointed out in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," in being confident in their forces and full of optimism, are moving along the path outlined by the party of Lenin. And in all stages of the Soviet state's development, the CPSU has given and does give primary significance to the ideological indoctrination of the masses. In working out the theoretical questions related to the development of the communist formation, V. I. Lenin drew attention to the particular importance of the party's activities aimed at indoctrinating a class awareness in the workers. He emphasized that "the development of the awareness of the masses remains, as always, the basis and main content of all our work."¹ Lenin's ideas and instructions were further developed in the decisions of the CPSU congresses and the plenums of its Central Committee, in other major party documents and in the works and speeches of the party and government leaders. They are also reflected in the CPSU Program where it is stated: "In the struggle for the victory of communism, ideological work will become an evermore important factor. The higher the awareness of society's members, the more fully and widely their creative activeness is developed in forming the material and technical base of communism, in developing the communist forms of labor and new relationships between people and, consequently, the more quickly and successfully the tasks of building communism will be carried out."²

The party has based communist indoctrination on the sound foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory which provides an opportunity to clearly see and profoundly understand the historical future and it helps to determine the direction of socioeconomic and political development in society for long years to come as well as to correctly understand international events. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" emphasized that "a knowledge of revolutionary theory and party policy in the Soviet people should be turned into a conviction, into an activist position in life for the steadfast fighter for communism, against any manifestations of alien ideology and into a guide to action or solving the urgent problems of developed socialism."³

The indoctrination of Army and Navy personnel in a communist spirit is carried out in an inseparable unity with the indoctrination of all the Soviet people and pursues the common goal of instilling in them the qualities inherent to the builders of a communist society and its defenders. Since the tasks confronting the Soviet military have specific features, communist indoctrination of the personnel is aimed primarily at raising political awareness, at their profound understanding of military duty and high responsibility for the fate of the socialist fatherland. It is also aimed at making certain that each serviceman is clearly aware of the historic purpose of the Armed Forces, that he is full of burning hate for the imperialist aggressors, hegemonists and revisionists and always be ready to unstintingly and ably defend the victories of Great October and worthily carry out the noble mission of an internationalist.

With an increase in the scale of communist construction, the volume, scale and importance of ideological work have risen. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "the more profound the change which we want to make, the more it is essential to increase interest in it and a conscious attitude, to convince ever-new millions and tens of millions of this necessity,"⁴ for social activeness in the masses to a decisive degree depends upon the level and effectiveness of the ideological influence on them.

The necessity of strengthening ideological and political indoctrination is also caused by the exacerbation of the international situation, by the increased activity of the propaganda media of the class enemy and by its increased attempts to have a disruptive effect on the awareness of the Soviet people.

In the spiritual sphere of world social development there is an acute, irreconcilable struggle being waged between two opposing ideologies--socialist and bourgeois. The ideologists of imperialism are zealously and maliciously working against progressive social changes in our world and are fabricating a multiplicity of reactionary myths and concepts. The ideologists of imperialism, revisionists and other anti-Soviets have chosen real socialism as one of the basic objects of their anticommunist, slanderous activities. They have distorted the essence of socialism, they have ascribed to it alien traits, features and fanciful properties and are against the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

The basic procedure of bourgeois propaganda is the "strategy of the big lie," the distorting of truth, slander, misinformation and ideological subversion. The apologists of imperialism unashamedly follow the principle: lies, noise, shouts and repeat the lie--there is bound to be some impact.

The growing influence of real socialism, the triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the successes of the Soviet people in building a communist society have evoked the anger and class hate of the imperialists and their supporters. In endeavoring to distort or blacken the ideals and principles adopted by us and to impede our advancement, they have resorted and, undoubtedly, will again repeatedly resort to the most refined methods of "psychological warfare" against the socialist system. "...If they cannot move against us now with weapons in hand, they can move with the weapons of lies and slander...",⁶ wrote V. I. Lenin after the end of the Civil War. These words are pertinent now because they precisely and fully characterize the anticommunist, anti-Soviet focus of modern bourgeois ideology.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, the increased role of ideological work has also been caused by a number of strictly specific features. Among these we would put: the increased

sociopolitical responsibility of the Army and Navy personnel for carrying out the tasks entrusted to them by the USSR Constitution of "securely defending the socialist fatherland, being in constant combat readiness guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor"; the strengthening influence of scientific-technical progress on the nature of military labor as this increases the importance of indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of collectivism and personal responsibility for carrying out service duties; the extremely high demands on the moral-political, combat and psychological qualities needed for successful operations in modern combat; the increased intellectual and cultural level of the men and their spiritual needs.

The 26th CPSU Congress pointed to the need of revising many areas and spheres of ideological work, raising it to a higher scientific level, strengthening professionalism and concreteness and the link with life and the carrying out of practical tasks, of developing its offensive nature in every possible way and increasing its effectiveness. It is essential to see to it, said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the congress, that the content of ideological work "becomes more pertinent and the forms meet the present needs and demands of the Soviet people" and that it be carried out "vitaly and interestingly, without pat phrases or a standard range of ready-made formulas."⁷

The essence of the party's ideological work consists in including Marxist-Leninist ideas in the awareness of people and ensuring their realization in practice. The core of ideological work and its foundation are comprised of developing in the Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces a communist ideology, indoctrinating them in a spirit of total dedication to the party's cause, a love for the socialist fatherland and a constant readiness to come to its defense and to worthily carry out one's international duty.

A communist ideology has arisen on the basis of Marxism-Leninism as the most complete and logically ordered system of philosophical, economic and sociopolitical views. An integrated communist ideology is a theoretically reasoned and scientifically based system of views concerning the world, the laws of its development and man himself. These are the general methodological principles for approaching the phenomena of reality, the problems of politics, ideology and social activity and personal life. The formation of this ideology is impossible without a profound explanation of CPSU policy to the men. For this reason, one of the main tasks in ideological work is a sound and systematic study of the theoretical heritage of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as well as the broad propagandizing of the major leading party and government documents. At present, this means to inform every serviceman of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, the subsequent plenums of the Party Central Committee and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," the materials of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party and state leaders. The essence of this very important work consists in using the entire diversity of forms and methods to disclose to the men in a clear, accessible and convincing manner the profound changes which have occurred in the economic and sociopolitical life of Soviet society over the period of its existence, to clearly show the advantages of our system and the historic significance of the victories won in communist construction and to profoundly disclose the role of the Leninist party which, being the nucleus of Soviet society's political system, wisely and confidently directs communist construction.

As a result of the constant and purposeful activities aimed at the communist indoctrination of the workers and the Army and Navy personnel, the CPSU has seen to it that a communist ideology which previously was found in a small group of communists has now become a mass ideology inherent to millions of Soviet people.

The Communist Party has also set as one of the leading areas of ideological work the establishing of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism in the conscience of the Army and Navy personnel and the indoctrinating in them of a spirit of pride for their fatherland and historic responsibility for the destiny of the victories of Great October.

On the threshold of the noteworthy date of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, in ideological work a special place is held by a clear and exemplary demonstration that in the struggle for the establishing of Soviet power and in the battles for socialism the union of the workers, peasants and laboring intelligentsia has become united and the friendship among the peoples of our multinational state has grown stronger.

In being guided by Lenin's nationality policy, the party has defended, as the apple of its eye, the unity and great fraternity of all the nations and nationalities in the USSR as these are one of the powerful sources of our strength and an essential condition for achieving new successes in the construction of communism. "History has confirmed," the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the 19th Komsomol Congress state, "the vital force of the unity, friendship and fraternity of all the nations and nationalities in the country. The young internationalist patriots must strengthen and add to this invaluable achievement of ours."⁹

Internationalism and friendship of peoples, as a principle in the organizational development of the socialist state's Armed Forces are manifested in the fact that all the peoples of the Soviet nation, in accord with the USSR Constitution, bear equal responsibility for the defense of the motherland. The Soviet Armed Forces, as was pointed out in the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the participants of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries and signed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are a vital embodiment of socialist internationalism and represent a united, solid family in which the sons of all the Soviet fraternal peoples undergo ideological, military and physical conditioning.

With the formation of the world socialist system, an urgent need arose to pay more attention to strengthening the unity of the Warsaw Pact member nations and the military alliance of their armies. The defensive military-political alliance of fraternal states is a dependable guarantee for the security of the peoples building socialism and communism and a strong support for peace and social progress. This has placed a duty on the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy to indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. Such work is being done constantly in the Armed Forces.

Under the conditions of an aggravated ideological struggle and international tension, when bourgeois propaganda in its subversive activities against real socialism has turned nationalism into one of the chief elements, the questions of patriotic and international indoctrination have assumed particular timeliness. In this regard it is essential to give a decisive rebuff to any manifestations of chauvinism or nationalism, "to form,"

as the Demand of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" demands, "in each Soviet person a conviction of the truthfulness and invincibility of socialism, a political vigilance and readiness to defend the motherland...."¹⁰

The communist ideology of the Soviet military, in being repeatedly tested in the course of the armed defense of the socialist fatherland, has permitted and does permit them to maintain an unshakable conviction of victory over any enemy, a profound optimism and certainty in the insurmountability of our social system.

An exceptionally important area in the work of forming a communist ideology among the Armed Forces personnel is the explaining of the foreign policy activities of the CPSU, the complexity of the present-day international situation and indoctrinating in the men a class hate for the imperialist aggressors and implacability against bourgeois and other hostile ideologies.

From the very first days of the existence of Soviet power, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have steadily and consistently carried out a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy. This is convincingly shown from one of the first documents of Soviet power, the Peace Decree. It stated: "The worker and peasant government created by the revolution of 24-25 October and based on the soviets of the worker, soldier and peasant deputies, proposes to all the belligerent peoples and governments that immediate talks be commenced on a just democratic peace."¹¹ At present, our party is also fighting steadily for peace. Confirmation of this is the Peace Program elaborated at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses and further developed at the 26th CPSU Congress as well as all the present-day foreign policy line of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, has made an enormous personal contribution to the cause of peace and detente. In his report at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he reaffirmed: "In order that our creative plans be carried out it is essential for us to keep the peace."¹²

At the same time, this does not mean that the desire for peace, detente and disarmament invalidates the laws of class struggle or reduces the pitch of the ideological clash between the two polar social systems. The experience of history shows that the more the sphere of imperialist domination in the world is narrowed, the more fiercely capital defends its positions. V. I. Lenin foresaw the inevitability of exacerbated class struggle. He wrote that capitalism "will not die immediately and will resist all the more fiercely the closer it comes to death...."¹³

At the present stage in the development of human society, capitalism is opposed not only by communist ideas, as was the case up to the birth of the first socialist state, but also by a new social system which is developing constantly and growing in might. In order to check the spread of Marxism-Leninism, the growing influence of real socialism and the pressure of the international workers and national liberation movements, the imperialists and their supporters have been forced to resort to various ideological and political maneuvers. In not limiting themselves to the clash of ideas, they have put everything to work in order to undermine the socialist foundations and are endeavoring by any means to turn people against socialism. But all their perfidious tricks, outright slander and ideological subversion have ultimately been unmasked and suffered defeat. Being unable to resist scientific communism and progress with

its own ideas which would be more attractive, modern imperialism has wagered on military might. At the beginning of the 1980's, its aggressiveness increased sharply. The U.S. militaristic circles and their NATO allies in international relations began to rely solely on force. This is particularly eloquently seen from the events in the Near East and in the area of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The present American administration is particularly zealous in increasing international tension and it with its NATO partners has set the aim of achieving military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact whatever the cost in order to then impose its will on the peoples of the world. The pretenders to world domination are endeavoring, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress, to redraw the political map of the world, declaring vast regions on all continents to be zones of their "vital interests."¹⁴

Proof of the aggressive plans of the U.S. imperialists is the military groupings fostered by them in Europe, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and in the zone of Central and South America. In order to justify the unchecked arms race and the creation of military blocs and bases, they have hidden behind the fabricated myth of the "Soviet military threat."

In striving for world domination, militant imperialism has rejected the peace initiatives of the USSR and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth and is carrying out direct and all-round preparations for war. The military preparations among the pretenders for world hegemony, as was pointed out by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, and their absurd military-strategic concepts and plans represent a real threat to world peace and for this reason at present it is particularly essential to observe high vigilance,¹⁵ and maintain constant combat readiness which would guarantee an immediate and decisive rebuff of the aggressors. In speaking at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, D. F. Ustinov emphasized that "in defending peace, we at the same time are not letting up in our vigilance and are strengthening the defense capability of the nation and the combat might of our Armed Forces."¹⁶

Daily purposeful ideological work must help in making the Army and Navy personnel profoundly aware of their practical tasks stemming from the historic purpose of the socialist state's army and the present-day international situation. In our Armed Forces, an ordered system of ideological and political indoctrination of the personnel has been constantly developed. Here the prime role is played by the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers in the course of which emphasis is placed on a profound study of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, the history of the CPSU, the documents of the party congresses, the Central Committee decrees, the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the urgent problems of the international communist, workers and national liberation movements and the questions of war and peace.

In addition to exercises in the Marxist-Leninist training groups, as before independent work remains an important and most effective form for raising the ideological and theoretical level of the officers. A sound knowledge of revolutionary and military theory makes it possible for the officers to show political maturity and a dialectical manner of thinking, to assuredly reason out difficult situations, to successfully carry out the tasks of troop training and indoctrination and to achieve new, higher indicators in improving the military skills of the personnel and in strengthening military discipline, organization and order.

The forming of a communist ideology in the Soviet military does not occur in isolation, but rather in close tie to the life of society and the troop collective as well as in the process of carrying out the tasks of military and political training. The more difficult the situation is, the harder it is to achieve the set goal, the more quickly such important qualities are developed as tenacity and stubbornness, consistency and decisiveness. Tactical exercises and maneuvers, sea cruises and flights, missile launches and firing, the driving of combat vehicles and the standing of alert duty—these are the conditions under which the necessary moral-combat qualities are developed in peacetime.

For the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], in the Armed Forces a practically tested system of political exercises has been organized and is effectively at work. In this area in recent years an essential step has been taken toward a more profound and thorough study of Marxist-Leninist theory and the urgent problems of communist construction and its defense. In the political exercise plans, subjects of military indoctrination hold a significant place.

The political exercises help each serviceman raise his ideological-theoretical level, to deepen his ideology and on this basis better realize his specific place and role in the struggle for building a communist society and his personal responsibility for maintaining high combat readiness in the subunit, unit or ship and the Armed Forces as a whole. Each political exercise conducted by a leader on a high scientific and procedural level is an effective incentive in concrete practical affairs to improve military skill, to master the military equipment and weapons and to strengthen proper order, troop discipline, organization and solidarity in the Army and Navy collectives.

The system of party studies plays an important role in raising the ideological-theoretical level and in the political indoctrination of the officers, the warrant officers, the party and Komsomol aktiv. One of the basic forms of this system is the evening universities. These basically train volunteer officer propagandists. Along with a deepening of theoretical knowledge, the students of these schools also gain useful practical skills.

The evening party schools have also become widespread in the Army and Navy. From these, 2-year ones are usually set up in the garrisons where there are no Marxism-Leninism universities. Yet the basic number is 1-year ones which train the party and Komsomol activists from among the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. In these schools the students are taught to work independently with primary sources and to utilize the obtained knowledge in carrying out practical tasks.

Other forms of ideological work are also utilized, including theoretical seminars, debates, scientific-practical conferences and the preparing of abstracts. Recently, the unified political days have become widespread in the Army and Navy. These are held once a month. The leadership from the directorates of the districts, fleets, groups of forces and formations as well as the representatives of the local party, soviet and Komsomol organizations give reports, talks, political information sessions and so forth directly in the companies and equal subunits. The most urgent questions of party domestic and foreign policy are explained to the personnel, the successes of the Soviet people in the sociopolitical development of our society are described, specific tasks are posed for ensuring the motherland's security and the need is indicated of strengthening vigilance and raising the combat readiness of the subunits, units, ships and formations. The remarkable Leninist tradition of being constantly in contact with the masses of soldiers is being enriched and developed under present-day conditions.

The military press has always played and does play an enormous role in the ideological and political indoctrination of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel. For example, during the years of the Great Patriotic War it was a powerful weapon. The newspapers and magazines honorably carried out the functions of a collective propagandist, an agitator and organizer of the Red Army and Red Navy masses, they contributed to their political, military and cultural indoctrination and called for victory over the enemy.

The CPSU Central Committee and the political bodies of the Armed Forces at present pay constant unflagging attention to the military press and see to it that it be politically purposeful and effective. In the hands of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists, the press represents a powerful means for the spiritual unification of the men and for mobilizing them to successfully carry out the tasks confronting them in defending the motherland.

At present, as was pointed out by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, the primary obligation of the command, political and engineer personnel and the Army and Navy party organizations "consists in bringing the great sense and historic importance of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress to the conscience and heart of each serviceman."¹⁷

During the days preceding the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, all the thoughts and deeds of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel are permeated by the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and by an awareness of the high responsibility to the party and people for the security of the motherland. Like all the Soviet people, the men of the Army and Navy in their activities proceed from the national task of raising in every possible way the quality indicators and effectiveness of military service and maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces in constant combat readiness. Here an important role is played by ideological work which shapes the communist ideology and conviction of the men. Precisely in ideology and conviction lie the deepest sources for the strength of moral-military qualities, one of the main factors in the high combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 13, p 376.
2. "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 116.
3. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 aprelya 1979 goda" [On the Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 9.
4. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, p 140.
5. [Not in text]
6. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, p 366.
7. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 75.

8. [Not in text]
9. PRAVDA, 18 May 1982.
10. "O 60-y godovshchine obrazovaniya SSSR. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 19 fevralya 1982 goda" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 19 February 1982], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 30.
11. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 13.
12. PRAVDA, 25 May 1982.
13. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 382.
14. See PRAVDA, 17 March 1982.
15. D. F. Ustinov, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], Voenizdat, 1982, pp 50-51.
16. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 May 1982.
17. Ibid., 10 March 1981.

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WARTIME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE XXV RIFLE CORPS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 11-17


[Article published under the heading: "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Col (Ret) V. Yevstratov: "Combat Operations of the XXV Rifle Corps in the Lublin-Brest Offensive Operation (18 July--7 August 1944)"]

[Text] As a result of the successful offensive by the troops on the right wing of the First Belorussian Front, by 16 July 1944, favorable conditions had been created for the advance of its forces on the left front of the Lublin-Brest Offensive Operation in the aim of defeating the Lublin and Brest Nazi groupings and the subsequent reaching of the line of the Vistula River.

For conducting the operation, by mid-July, on the left wing of the First Belorussian Front to the south of Polesye, a strong assault grouping of troops was organized, consisting of the 70th, 47th, 8th Guards, 69th, the 1st Polish and 2d Tank Armies, the XI Tank Corps, the II and VII Guards Cavalry Corps.

The troops on the left wing of the First Belorussian Front, in accord with the operation's plan, received the mission of commencing the offensive on 18 July. The XXV Rifle Corps of the 69th Army was ordered to turn over a portion of its zone on the left flank to the divisions of the LXI Rifle Corps and, having concentrated the main forces on the right flank to the north of the Turya River, to break through the Büfal Line at Dolsk and subsequently to develop the offensive to the west in the aim of crossing the Western Bug River without a halt. The troops in the corps in the zone of the offensive surpassed the enemy by 1.5-fold for personnel and by 1.6-fold for artillery.¹ The corps commander, Maj Gen A. B. Barinov, decided to concentrate two-thirds of the resources in an area (to the north of the Turya River) around 4 km wide. The basic task was assigned to the 77th Guards Rifle Division which received a zone of advance of about 1.5 km. To the left of it in an area of 2.5 km the 41st Rifle Division was to break through the enemy defenses while the 4th Rifle Division was to conduct constraining actions on a front of 11 km (see the diagram on following page).

By the decisive massing of resources in the sector of the main thrust, in the breakthrough areas predominant superiority in resources was achieved over the enemy: 3-fold for personnel, 5-fold for artillery and tanks. In order to maintain this superiority in the course of the battle, it was planned that the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions were to be formed up in three echelons and this made it possible to constantly increase the strength of the strike.



Breaching of Defenses and Exploitation of Success by XXV Rifle Corps

The corps staff headed by Maj Gen M. A. Lavrent'yev carefully planned troop operations, it organized and covertly carried out their regrouping. By the end of 17 July, the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions had taken up their zones while the 4th Rifle Division, having turned over a portion of its zone to the LXI Rifle Corps, took up the defense on the eastern bank of the Turya River.

The artillery softening up started at dawn of 18 July, and an hour later, when the artillery troops had shifted their fire in depth, the subunits of the 215th Guards Rifle Regiment from the 77th Guards Rifle Division and the 139th Rifle Regiment of the 41st Rifle Division rose up to the attack. Having crushed the stubborn resistance of the enemy 698th and 554th Infantry Regiments, our units began to outflank Dolsk on the north and south. By 1200 hours, by a pincer strike they drove the enemy out of Dolsk. For the further development of the offensive and for broadening the breach, the second echelons of the divisions were committed to battle. These completed the breakthrough of the first enemy defensive zone and by the end of the day had threatened to outflank to the north the units of the 1st Ski-Chasseur and the 214th Infantry Divisions which were opposing the 4th Rifle Division.

During the night of 19 July, the enemy decided to pull back these formations. Well organized reconnaissance made it possible for the commander of the 4th Rifle Division, Maj Gen P. S. Furtenko, to promptly detect the start of the enemy retreat. Even during the night its 101st and 39th Rifle Regiments began to pursue the enemy.

The Nazis put up stubborn resistance, endeavoring to check our advance and ensure the organized retreat of its troops to the line of the Western Bug. But the rapid advance by the divisions of the XXV Rifle Corps thwarted the plans of the Nazi Command. By the end of 19 July, they had advanced 20-30 km while the forward detachment of the 77th Guards Rifle Division consisting of two rifle companies and ten SU-76 [self-propelled artillery mounts] from the 1205th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment led by Maj V. M. Kistarev, reached the western frontier of the USSR in the area of Vysotsk.² The instructor from the division's political section, Maj A. A. Makarovskiy, put up a red flag on the eastern bank of the Western Bug as a symbol of the restoration of the state frontier. The division's regiments endeavored to be the first to reach it.

In the morning of 20 July, the forward subunits of the 218th and 221st Guards Rifle Regiments from the 77th Guards Rifle Division reached the eastern bank of the river area Terekhi, Vysotsk. At the population points of Bindyuga and Bystraki, the frontier was reached by the companies of Sr Lts B. M. Bystrov and G. I. Maslov from the 41st Division of Maj Gen F. I. Chernyak. By noon, the main forces of these divisions had arrived.

The Soviet troops had reached the goal for which they had been working for 3 long and difficult years. But they still had to carry out a number of difficult tasks. On the other side of the Bug, the Polish people were suffering under the bloody Nazi yoke and hundreds of thousands of Soviet young men and women driven into Nazi slavery were in captivity. They turned their eyes with hope to the East where, in the course of fierce bloody engagements, the Soviet Army was driving the Nazi hordes to the west, bringing with them long-awaited liberty. Explaining to the men their international duty and the great liberation mission of the Soviet Army became a matter of particular concern for the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations. For this reason, the order of the commander of the 69th Army, Lt Gen V. Ya. Kolpakchi, to the XXV Rifle Corps to cross the Western Bug and continue the advance was greeted by the men with great enthusiasm.

While the main forces were being drawn up to the river, the forward detachments of the divisions and regiments without any pause began the crossing. The first in the corps to cross to the western bank was the platoon of Lt L. K. Levin from the 5th Company of the 102d Rifle Division of the 41st Division, and by 2000 hours on 20 August, the entire regiment had crossed the Bug to the north of Bindyugi and, having flown the enemy back behind the Wielnianska River, dug in on its eastern bank.³

The crossing was carried out on a broad front, and this prevented the enemy from determining the axis of the main thrust by the corps and concentrate its reserves there. The units did not halt their actions at night. During the morning of 21 July, the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions had captured five bridgeheads. In exploiting the success of the 102d Regiment, Maj Gen S. I. Chernyak committed the 244th Rifle Regiment of Col M. V. Kolesov to the engagement. This unit crossed the Wielnianska without a pause, having created favorable conditions for the further offensive by the division.⁴

During the night of 21 July, the pontoon bridge engineers from the battalion of Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col G. I. Sklyar threw up a raft crossing which made it possible to accelerate the concentration of combat equipment on the bridgeheads and improve troop supply. In the morning, after 10 minutes of intense shelling, the corps first echelon formations went over to the offensive, they drove the Nazis back several kilometers and linked all the bridgeheads into one. The enemy put up stubborn resistance in population points specially prepared for defense. But our units, without engaging in frontal battles, maneuvered, striking in the flank and rear. An example of successful maneuvering actions would be the battle of the 41st Rifle Division for the population point of Dubienka which was liberated by the 244th Rifle Regiment from the north and the 139th from the south. Turning up in the rear of the enemy strongpoint, our regiments attacked it from two sides and captured Dubienka almost without losses.

However, subsequently the corps' advance slowed down. A shortage of crossing equipment was felt as there was only one bridge crossing in use. Having advanced 20-35 km by 23 July, the units of the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions encountered

stubborn enemy resistance and halted. The corps commander decided to accelerate the moving up of the second echelon (the 4th Rifle Division) in order to increase the drive and overcome the resistance of enemy divisions. During the night of 24 July, the troops were regrouped. The 4th Rifle Division was committed to battle between the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions. In the morning of 24 July, after a 20-minute artillery softening up, all three formations went over to the offensive. The enemy resistance was crushed. A general pursuit of the enemy commenced.

The army commander ordered the corps commander to advance rapidly to the Wieprz River and cross it without a halt. In carrying out the order, the 77th Guards and 4th Rifle Divisions on 25 July crossed the water barrier on a 10-km sector from Lipiennik to Krasnystaw. The attempt by the Nazis to throw the 220th and 101st Regiments from the 4th Rifle Division off the western bank were successfully repelled. The formation attacked the enemy in Krasnystaw, with two regiments attacking from the northwest and one from the east. During the second half of the night, the city was cleared of enemy troops.⁵

Not being able to hold the line of the Wieprz River, the Nazis, in carrying out rearguard actions, began to retreat behind the Vistula. The retreat was promptly detected. The commanders of the 77th Guards and 4th Rifle Divisions⁶ assigned one forward detachment each in the aim of rapidly reaching the Vistula, capturing areas convenient for crossing and supporting the crossing of the river by the main forces of the divisions without any halt.

The forward detachment of the 77th Guards Rifle Division consisting of a rifle battalion, two artillery battalions, two SU-76 batteries and a combat engineer company, headed by the deputy division commander, Hero of the Soviet Union Col A. G. Boytsov, was given the task to cross the Vistula in the area of Bialobrzegi, Boiska during the night of 28 July and capture a bridgehead on its western bank. In advancing rapidly along routes parallel to the retreating enemy, the forward detachment in the second half of 27 July had reached the Vistula. However, the disregarding of camouflage measures caused the detachment to be detected by the Nazis defending on the western bank. The loss of surprise did not make it possible for our subunits to cross the river without a halt.⁷

The forward detachment of the 4th Rifle Division headed by the deputy division commander Col V. D. Kiselev, consisting of a rifle battalion, an artillery battalion, a SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] battery and a combat engineer company, by the morning of 28 July, was concentrated in the area of Zgoda some 1.5 km away from the Vistula. Col V. D. Kiselev with the rifle battalion commander Maj M. U. Chebot'ko, the battalion engineer Maj K. S. Fateyev and others conducted a brief reconnaissance, having selected the place for the crossing considering the nature of the river and the enemy defenses.⁸ Due to the fact that the enemy was closely watching the river and the approaches to it, it was decided to make the crossing at night. The day was employed to prepare the equipment and personnel as well as to organize cooperation.

With the onset of darkness, combat engineers and rifle subunits covertly advanced to the river, carrying boats. By 0230 hours of 29 July, the first boats pushed off from the eastern bank and by dawn a battalion with firearms and two 45-mm cannons had dug in on the western bank. In working quickly and decisively with the support of artillery fire from the eastern bank, the battalion broke the Nazi resistance and by

1300 hours had captured a bridgehead near Kempa Piotrowinska up to 1.5 km along the front and 0.5 km in depth.⁹

The loss of surprise by the forward detachment of the 77th Guards Rifle Division told negatively on the actions of the formation's main forces which in fact did not succeed in crossing the Vistula without a halt. The enemy increased the combat readiness of its troops and intensified observation of the river. At night it continuously was illuminated by rockets. Moreover, the attempt to cross the water barrier by the main forces was carried out without proper reconnaissance of the enemy defenses. As a result of this, the regimental and battalion artillery which did not have data on the Nazi artillery was unable to neutralize it and effectively support the infantry operations. Individual small groups which did reach the opposite shore could not hold it.¹⁰

The units of the 4th Rifle Division fought more successfully. During the night of 30 July, in the region of Piotrowin, the battalions of Maj I. A. Radionov and Capt G. V. Gerasimov under the overall command of the deputy commander of the 101st Rifle Regiment, Maj Ye. I. Sokolov, crossed the river on landing boats and a 2-ton raft made from barrels. In broadening the bridgehead, they linked up with the battalion from the 220th Rifle Regiment which had already successfully crossed the river.

In the morning of 30 July, the army commander ordered the corps commander to take up the defensive on the eastern bank while the 77th Guards and 41st Rifle Divisions were to cross to the bridgehead of the 274th Rifle Division of the adjacent corps in order to widen the bridgehead by common effort. This decision was explained by the fact that on the army right flank, the size of the bridgehead was around 19 km along the front and for this reason Lt Gen V. Ya. Kolpakchi decided not to split up the forces and, in abandoning the crossing of the Vistula in the zone of the XXV Rifle Corps to focus efforts on the widening of the already-held bridgehead.

The 77th Guards Rifle Division, after the crossing, was to relieve the units of the 274th Rifle Division and, in going over to the offensive, to break through the enemy defenses in the area of Chotcza-Gorna, Chotcza-Dolna and, in cooperation with the adjacent unit on the right, to widen the bridgehead in a western and southwestern direction. The division was given 24 hours to prepare for the crossing.

Simultaneously with carrying out the measures to prepare for the crossing, preparations were made for the offensive with the procedure for relieving the troops and for cooperation in the forthcoming battle being planned and coordinated with the staff of the 274th Division, its units and subunits. In order to carry out the entire amount of preparatory work in such a short time, officers from the corps staff and political section helped the division's command. The corps commander, Maj Gen A. B. Barinov, directly led the organizing of cooperation. The chief of the corps political section, Col A. M. Korpachev, held a conference for the leading political workers where the corps commander spoke. In the division's units, meetings were held for the party aktiv, and party and Komsomol meetings in the subunits. The combat engineers built 11 rafts using landing boats. Particular attention was given to camouflage measures since because of the insignificant depth of the bridgehead the Nazis could fire on the crossing with artillery and mortars.

At 0200 hours on 1 August, in the region of Maidany (Rybaki) the first boats pushed off from the shore with a party of infantry from the 218th Guards Rifle Regiment

of Col I. S. Lavrinov. After landing, the regiment relieved the subunits of the 961st Rifle Regiment in an organized and concealed manner and took up the defensive facing the southwest, with the left flank abutting the river. The crossing and relief of the troops were carried out just as successfully in the sector of the 221st Guards Rifle Regiment of Maj M. V. Pashchenko. By the morning of 2 August, the crossing of the division's main forces had been completed and the crossing of the 1205th SAU Regiment, the 41st Rifle Division and the rear services commenced.¹¹

Regardless of the enemy's proximity, the lack of bridges and insufficient landing equipment, the crossing and relieving of the troops were carried out in an organized, concealed and rapid manner. This was aided by firm troop control by the corps staff, the precise and dependable work of the commandant [traffic control] service on the crossings and bridgehead, by the able use of the crossing equipment and by the constant, purposeful and effective work of the political bodies, the party and Komsomol aktiv.

The enemy constantly counterattacked our units, trying to throw them back from the bridgehead, however the clearly organized reconnaissance, close cooperation with the artillery and decisive actions by the guardsmen thwarted the plans of the Nazi command. On 2 August, after a 20-minute artillery softening-up, the regiments from the first echelon of the 77th Guards Rifle Division went over to the attack, they broke through the enemy defenses in the area of Chotcza-Dolna and began to develop the offensive toward Kresy. On the following day, the division's commander Maj Gen V. S. Askalepov committed the 215th Guards Rifle Regiment to the battle. During the 3 days of heavy battles, the division caused significant losses to the 355th Infantry Regiment of the 214th Infantry Division and to a battalion of the 172d Reserve Division, having captured the tactically important elev. 160.2, the population point of Chotcza-Dolna and a significant portion of Chotcza-Gorna, having widened the bridgehead up to 5.5 km along the front and up to 3 km in depth. The Nazis, in bringing up reserves against the bridgehead, halted the corps' offensive. On 7 August the XXV Rifle Corps was ordered to go over to the defensive, with the transfer of the 41st Division to the XCI Rifle Corps.¹²

This ended the combat operations of the XXV Rifle Corps in the Lublin-Brest Operation. Its formations, having fought over 180 km, crossed the Western Bug and Wieprz Rivers without a halt and broke through several prepared enemy defensive lines, advancing at an average rate (up to the Vistula River) of around 20 km a day. The corps participated in the capturing of a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula (subsequently named the Pulawy) and from which in January 1945, the troops of the First Belorussian Front launched a crushing attack against the Nazi troops. For the exemplary fulfillment of the orders of the command in breaking through the defenses of the Nazi troops to the southwest of Kovel and for crossing the Western Bug and Wieprz without a halt, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 9 August 1944, the 41st Rifle Division and the 1205th SAU Regiment were awarded the Red Banner while the 77th Guards Rifle Division received the Order of Suvorov, Second Degree.

The combat operations of the XXV Rifle Corps are very instructive. They provide an example of the successful, successive crossing of several water barriers and the breaking through of intermediate enemy defensive lines without a halt. This experience teaches that success in a crossing depends primarily upon the prompt assigning of forward detachments and upon their decisive and rapid actions. The success of the

forward detachments in capturing the crossing and bridgeheads was decisively influenced by their achieving surprise. To ensure the crossing of rivers without a halt, the main forces had to promptly follow up on the success of the forward detachments and for this they should pursue the retreating enemy rapidly along parallel routes in not engaging the enemy rearguards in frontal battles. Under the conditions of the enemy's retreat and its lack of sufficient reserves, the crossing of a water barrier along a broad front was of important significance.

The experience of the XXV Corps showed that success in the crossing of the river by the main forces depended substantially upon the results of reconnoitering the opposite bank and upon a knowledge of the enemy defenses on it. The success in breaking through intermediate lines depended largely upon the continuity of our troops' combat operations. In the XXV Corps this was achieved by the deep echeloning of the formations, by the prompt committing of fresh forces to battle in the aim of increasing the force on the main sector, withdrawing the weakened units and formations to the second echelon as well as by conducting a continuous offensive both during the day and at night. Continuous actions ensured a high rate of advance, depriving the Nazis of the possibility of promptly pulling back the troops to intermediate lines. The high rates of advance were also ensured by the broad and decisive maneuvering of the units in the aim of attacking the enemy centers of resistance from the flanks and rear.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 426, inv. 10753, file 791, sheet 26.
2. Ibid., folio 1137, inv. 1, file 13, sheet 12.
3. Ibid., folio 877, inv. 15140, file 1, sheet 437.
4. Ibid., folio 1137, inv. 1, file 13, sheet 12.
5. Ibid., folio 877, inv. 32698, file 2, sheet 129.
6. From the line of the Wieprz River, the 41st Rifle Division was transferred to the second echelon of the corps.
7. TsAMO, folio 1223, inv. 1, file 23, sheet 73.
8. Ibid., folio 1051, inv. 1, file 7, sheet 330.
9. Ibid., folio 877, inv. 32698, file 3, sheet 228.
10. Ibid., folio 1223, inv. 1, file 138, sheet 75.
11. Ibid., file 24, sheets 57, 59.
12. Ibid., folio 426, inv. 10753, file 620, sheet 81.

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WARTIME DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR

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
[Article published under the heading "On the 40th Anniversary of the Stalingrad Battle" by Lt Gen V. Anoshkin and Col N. Naumov: "On the Stabilizing of the Defensive Front in the Southern Strategic Sector During the Summer of 1942"]

[Text] The breakthrough by the Nazi hordes in the summer of 1942 into the great arc of the Don and later into the Northern Caucasus led to a disruption of stability on the southern wing of the strategic defensive front of the Soviet troops. As a result of this and the losses suffered by the troops, unprotected or poorly defended sectors arose. For reinforcing them it was essential to bring up reserves and form defensive groupings on new lines and then by stubborn resistance to stabilize the defenses, to give them the necessary stability and not allow a new breakthrough.

The difficulty of stabilizing the southern wing of the strategic defensive front was that the basic reserves of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] had been formed to the north of the Middle Don, that is, away from the axis of operations by the shock groupings of German troops. With the enemy's capture of the basic main rail lines running to the south, the bringing up of men and equipment from the center of the nation to the Caucasus was further complicated. There were only two routes left: along the Volga and the Caspian Sea and through the regions of Central Asia.

Hq SHC promptly ascertained that the enemy was intending to develop the offensive along two major axes, the Stalingrad and the Caucasian, in the aim of cutting off the south of the nation from the center of the USSR, to capture the Caucasus with its basic sources of oil and the oil refining industry.

Hq SHC initially intended to stabilize the defensive front on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front within the large arc of the Don. For this, on 12 July, it established two lines (see the diagram¹): the first from Veshenskaya, through Millerovo to Rostov which should defend the Southern Front with the 28th, 38th, 57th and 9th Armies which had been turned over to it from the Southwestern Front which had been abolished on 12 July; the 2d from Voronezh along the Upper and Middle Don and then along the Stalingrad line and the lower courses of the Don. Its defenses were entrusted to the Bryansk, the newly created Voronezh (7 July) and Stalingrad (12 July) Fronts to the 51st Army of the Northern Caucasus Front and the troops of the Southern Front.



Restoring the Strategic Defensive Front of the Soviet Troops in the Stalingrad Sector

The plan of Hq SHC to form a deep strategic defense within the large arc of the Don was not carried out. The armies transferred to the Southern Front were unable to occupy the first defensive line since their pullback was late in starting and the enemy tank corps, having resumed the offensive on 13 July from the region of Kantemirovka to the south, reached their rear, forcing them to retreat not to the east, but rather toward the Lower Don. Because of this, the necessary time could not be gained to organize and prepare the defenses in the southern line.

The sector along the lower courses of the Don was the weakest link in the new defensive front. For taking up the defenses along the line from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the Sal River (180 km), the 51st Army had just four just-reformed divisions. The defensive zone of the Southern Front consisted of around 150 km, however in the retreat its armies suffered substantial losses. Thus, just 54,000 men remained in the 37th, 12th and 18th Armies. The 9th Army was particularly weakened and it had just 1,113 men, 1 light machine gun, 9 guns and 32 mortars.³

It was not possible to shift troops to reinforce the Caucasian sector in a short period of time since the rail line from Stalingrad to Tikhoretskaya in the middle of July was still threatened by enemy capture. As a result, the enemy, having created a many-fold superiority on the left flank of the 51st Army and to the east of Rostov, broke through the defenses on the Lower Don and was rushing toward the Caucasus.

In anticipating the possibility of a Nazi breakthrough to the Caucasus, Hq SHC even in the autumn of 1941 had issued an order to prepare the defenses. This instructed the Transcaucasian Front by 30 July 1942 to take up the defensive along the Terek River and the Main Caucasian Range. However, the engineer work on the lines remained uncompleted. The length of the southern sector of the strategic front now reached 2,400 km, that is, 1,600 km more than at the start of the campaign. Because of this, in July-August there were many sectors not occupied by troops.

Hq SHC for carrying out the 1942 summer campaign prepared large reserves including 120 rifle divisions⁴ and around 30 tank and mechanized corps. However, due to the lack of weapons, it was possible to complete forming the formations of just five reserve armies, and even these not completely. Precisely they were the material basis for forming the new defensive groupings on the Voronezh and Stalingrad Fronts which together with the Bryansk Front were to defend along the Upper and Middle Don. Hq SHC on 12 July incorporated as part of the former [the Voronezh Front], the 60th and 6th Armies which were the renamed 3d and 6th Reserve Armies as well as the pulled-back 40th and 2d Air Armies and four tank corps; the latter [the Stalingrad Front] included the 63d, 62d and 64th Armies which had been, respectively, the renamed 5th, 7th and 1st Reserve Armies, the pulled-back 2d and 8th Air Armies and later on the 28th, 38th and 57th Armies and the 1st and 4th Tank Armies which were quickly organized from the corps arriving on the front. For defending the lower courses of the Don, Hq SHC could field only the 51st Army and a portion of the troops of the Southern Front.

For increasing the combat capability of the pulled-back 38th, 40th and 21st Armies, Hq SHC assigned 11 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 10 tank brigades and 12 separate tank battalions. It transferred 3 tank corps to the Stalingrad Front and later an equal number was shifted from the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts. By the end of July, the number of tanks in it had risen by 535 units.⁵ Artillery and engineer units and subunits made up of drafts of reinforcements arrived in significant numbers. In September alone, the Voronezh Front received almost 44,000 men and the Stalingrad Front some 62,500 men.⁶ As a total from 23 July through 1 October, 55 rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 7 tank corps and 30 tank brigades were moved up to the Stalingrad sector.⁷

There was intense replacement and organization of the air forces. From 20 July through 17 August, the 8th Air Army received 23 air regiments from the reserves of Hq SHC. The 16th Air Army was created by regrouping the air formations and units in the

Stalingrad Front after its splitting. Five long-range air divisions were moved closer to Stalingrad.

The creation of a troop grouping for defending the Caucasus was extremely difficult. On 28 July, Hq SHC united the troops of the Southern and Northern Caucasus Fronts. Since the length of the defensive line of the newly created Northern Caucasus Front could reach 1,500 km, it was split into two operational groups. From 1 September, the defense of the Caucasus was entrusted to the Transcaucasian Front which had Northern and Black Sea troop groups.

For creating a defensive grouping in the Western Caucasus and along the Terek River, in addition to the forces shifted from the Northern Caucasus Front, the 46th Army was also employed (this had been covering the Turkish frontier and the Black Seacoast) and the 44th Army of the Transcaucasian Front. However, a portion of their formations was used to bring other armies up to strength and they also included weakened divisions. This made it possible in each army to have a battleworthy nucleus of troops which covered particularly important sectors and under its cover to rebuild the weakened formations using local human and material resources. At the same time, eight divisions were being quickly organized which had been pulled back from the Northern Caucasus and a number of divisions of the Transcaucasian Front were brought up to strength.

In August, 2 rifle corps and 11 rifle brigades arrived from the center down the Volga and across the Caspian Sea via Astrakhan, Krasnovodsk, Makhachkala and Baku to the Transcaucasian Front. Simultaneously, defensive positions were built here. The local population (90,000 persons) was involved in this and the number of engineer and combat engineer battalions increased by 6-fold.⁹

In the course of the fierce battle, Hq SHC formed and remanned a number of armies and individual formations. Even in August-September, the 1st Guards, the 24th and 66th Armies arrived near Stalingrad, the 57th Army was brought up to strength and the new formation of the 28th Army was commenced.

The strengthening of the moral and psychological tenacity of the troops was an important factor in stabilizing the newly created sector of the strategic front. The Soviet military, in the course of the winter successes, had gained confidence in their forces. However, as a result of the unsuccessful outcome of the 1942 spring operations in the Crimea, near Kharkov and to the south of Leningrad, tank panic again began to occur in the troops and the enemy air strikes came to have a demoralizing effect. All of this was reflected in their actions in holding on to the defensive lines.

The order of the People's Commissar of Defense, I. V. Stalin, No 227 of 28 July 1942 was of great significance in increasing the morale of the defending troops. It stated: "...It is time to end the retreat. Not a step back! Now this should be our main challenge. It is essential to defend each position, each meter of Soviet territory stubbornly and to the last drop of blood, to cling to each piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity."¹⁰

In accord with this order, active party political work commenced in the troops so that each soldier became profoundly aware that the fate of the motherland depended upon his tenacity and ability to fight. At the party and Komsomol meetings and service conferences, sharp criticism was directed against the poor actions of a number of commanders and instances of cowardice in the subunits and units. All of this made

it possible to sharply raise the level of psychological strength in the personnel, to strengthen the steadiness and tenacity of defense and increase its activeness.

The bringing up of large reserves to the southern wing of the strategic defensive front and the increased moral-psychological condition of the troops created the necessary prerequisites for its final stabilization. Initially in July, the necessary stability was acquired on the defensive front in the section from Livny to the small bend in the Don. This was aided by the bringing up of large reserves of Hq SHC as well as the carrying out of a particular offensive operation by the troops on the left wing of the Western Front in the region of Zhizdry, Bolkhov (5-12 July), by the counterthrusts of the Bryansk Front (from 6 through 8 July) and by the offensive of the Voronezh Front (6-17 August). These measures not only made it possible to tie down the forces of the 2d German and 2d Hungarian Armies, but also forced the command of the Army Group "B" to use a portion of the 6th Army forces to secure its left wing. Due to this, its possibilities for a subsequent offensive against Stalingrad were substantially reduced.

In mid-July, when the enemy was approaching the defensive lines of the 62d and 64th Armies, Hq SHC was planning an offensive as follows: the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts were to move toward Rzhev and Sychevka, those of the Northwestern Front were to encircle and destroy the Demyansk enemy grouping, while those of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts would advance on the Mga-Sinyavino axis. This would tie down not only the opposing enemy forces, depriving it of a possibility to shift a portion of them to the southern wing of the strategic front, but would also force the use of a large number of reserves to reinforce the secondary sectors.

The offensive by the enemy forces against Stalingrad started on 23 July. In 2 days, they succeeded in breaking through the defenses to the west of the Don and threaten the 62d Army with encirclement. For preventing the enemy from breaking through to the Volga, Hq SHC chose an active method for conducting the defenses, namely the making of a counterthrust by the just-organized 1st and 4th Tank Armies as well as with the reserve of the 64th Army which occupied the defenses to the south of the 62d. Although the advance by the counterstrike groupings was not so significant, the very fact of high activity by the Soviet troops combined with the restoring of the defensive front on the Middle Volga and preparations for an offensive operation in the Voronezh area, had a sobering effect on the Nazi military leadership. The command of the Army Group "B" concluded that under the conditions of a stabilization of defenses by the Soviet troops along the Upper and Middle Don and the bringing up of large reserves here, the capturing of Stalingrad and then Astrakhan by just the 6th Army was impossible. The higher Nazi leadership on 31 July also sent the 4th Tank Army against Stalingrad. By reaching the Volga, it was hoping to deprive the Soviet troops defending the Caucasus of help and this, in the enemy's opinion, should help capture the Caucasian oil fields.

On 23 August, the enemy with complete confidence of success began a decisive drive in the aim of capturing Stalingrad. For the defenders of the city, this day was the most difficult. The enemy XIV Tank Corps broke through to the Volga to the north of the city. Nazi aircraft fiercely bombed its districts.

Upon the instructions of Hq SHC, the command of the Stalingrad Front (commander, Col Gen A. I. Yerenenko, military council member N. S. Khrushchev and chief of staff, Maj Gen D. N. Nikishev) adopted a number of energetic measures to prevent the enemy from capturing the city. The 63d and 21st Armies, having crossed the Don, attacked

the troops of the 8th Italian Army, and seized an extensive bridgehead to the west of Serafimovich, threatening to break through into the rear of the 6th German Army. This forced the enemy to shift a portion of forces from the 79th Infantry and 22d Tank Divisions to the threatened sector. The 1st Guards Army and the groups of Gens A. A. Kovalenko and A. D. Shtevnev made strong counterstrikes.

Although the actions of the Soviet troops checked the enemy's offensive and did not allow it to break through to Stalingrad, the 62d Army was cut off from the main forces of the front. A half of its units were still on the Don, while the right flank and the routes leading to Stalingrad were little defended. An enemy breakthrough to the city was not excluded. In the developing situation, for stabilizing the defenses it was better to pull the army back to the inner defensive perimeter. A shortening of the length of its front line would make it possible to consolidate the troop defenses and not allow the Nazis to reach the city.

Due to the significant enemy superiority, particularly in tanks, the 64th and 57th Armies of the Southeastern Front, in stabilizing the defenses on the southern approaches to Stalingrad, emphasized the strong holding of the occupied positions. In maneuvering the reserves, they fortified those defensive sectors where the enemy would endeavor to break through to the city. The use of positional defenses made it possible within a period of 10 days to repel the pressure of superior enemy forces. Only on 29 August did the enemy succeed in breaking through a weakened sector in the defenses of the 64th Army and force it to retreat to the middle defensive perimeter.

In the course of the offensive, the enemy again suffered many losses, however, it still had opportunities to quickly reinforce the Army Group "B". The Nazi command brought its strength up to 69 divisions. Upon a decision of Hq SHC, at the beginning of September, the 24th, 66th and remanned 1st Guards Armies attacked from an area to the north of Stalingrad. As a result, it was possible to distract a portion of the enemy troops advancing on the city. In the aim of pinning down enemy forces, in the middle of the month the armies of the Voronezh Front commenced an offensive.

Army Group "A" had created three groupings to complete the capture of the Caucasus. The 1st Tank Army with four divisions was to attack toward Ordzhonikidze, Groznyy and Makhachkala and break through to Baku; the XLIX Mountain Rifle Corps was given the mission of taking the Greater Caucasus and capturing Kutaisi, while the attack grouping of the 17th Army which consisted of up to seven divisions was to fight its way along the Black Seacoast to Poti.

For thwarting the enemy's plans and for stabilizing the defenses on the line of the Greater Caucasian Range, the command of the Transcaucasian Front, upon instructions from Hq SHC, widely employed the positional method for conducting the defensive combined with decisive counterstrikes. In the region of Ordzhonikidze, the enemy 1st Tank Army twice went over to the offensive. Its progress was halted by the stubborn retaining of the positions, by strong counterattacks and air strikes, the divisions suffered great losses and their defensive capabilities by the end of September had been undermined. The XLIX Mountain Rifle Corps succeeded in capturing a number of passes, however by the rapid bringing up of reserves, the endangered sectors were securely covered by troops and the counterattacks undertaken forced the enemy to give up a further advance.

Although the enemy offensive was checked, it did not abandon the achieving of the set goals. On 13 September, battles started directly for Stalingrad. Some 13 divisions, including 3 tank and 1 motorized (a total of 170,000 soldiers and officers, 1,700 guns and mortars and around 500 tanks) attempted a desperate storming of the city and its adjacent settlements.¹²

In repelling the enemy offensive, the Soviet Command emphasized the retaining of the major installations of the city, turning them into strongpoints and defensive centers. With the breaking through of the enemy, strong counterattacks and counterstrikes were made in the aim of recovering the captured positions. When in the center of the city, individual detachments were approaching the bank of the Volga through Mamayev Kurgan, Hq SHC shifted the 13th Guards Division to the Southeastern Front. It attacked and in the course of fierce battles drove back the enemy. Thus, the enemy's attempt to break through to the Volga in the center of the city was eliminated.

The stabilizing of the southern wing of the strategic defensive front during the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 required great efforts from the Supreme High Command, from the commands of the fronts, armies, formations and units as well as enormous effort from the troops. The integrity of the front was restored primarily by the bringing up of major strategic reserves to the front line and by bringing the retreating formations and field forces up to full strength.

At the same time, Headquarters carried out extensive measures to improve control and command.

A new feature in the leadership of armed combat was the more precise coordinating of troop efforts in the various strategic sectors in the aim of carrying out the basic task of the command. Particularly close cooperation was organized between the fronts and armies defending the large arc of the Don and Stalingrad.

Hq SHC made a significant effort to bring up to full strength the field forces and formations which had been pulled back to new defensive lines, to regularly replace the divisions which had suffered losses and to bring them up to strength with recruits.

The success of stabilizing the strategic defensive front was determined by the able combination of stubborn retention of the lines held by the troops with great activity of the operational reserves. The making of strong counterstrikes disorganized the offensive enemy operations, it undermined enemy confidence in success and forced it to make major changes in the operational plans. This led to the loss of time and a slower rate of advance. This provided an opportunity for the Soviet Command to increase the forces on the endangered sectors and to increase the stability of the most important sectors of the front.

The stabilizing of the strategic front was also aided by the conducting of offensive operations in its stable sectors. Here opposing enemy forces were pinned down and this restricted its capabilities to reinforce groupings in other sectors of the advance.

Of particularly important significance in stabilizing the strategic defensive front was the increased limits of troop psychological stability and tenacity in defending the occupied lines. Due to the prompt measures undertaken by Hq SHC as well as to the active and purposeful work of all the army political bodies, the commanders and staffs, this very complex problem was resolved in a short period of time.

As a whole, the broad range of operational-strategic, political and economic measures carried out by Hq SHC and the command of the fronts made it possible to stabilize the strategic defensive front on the southern wing and create the prerequisites for going over to a counteroffensive.

FOOTNOTES

1. The diagram shows only the Stalingrad sector which in the summer of 1942 became the main one.
2. [Not in text]
3. TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 228, inv. 711, file 1044, sheet 109.
4. Ibid., folio 56, inv. 12236, file 37, sheets 4, 2; file 122, sheet 43.
5. Ibid., folio 220, inv. 220, file 13, sheets 1, 89, 93.
6. Ibid., folio 56, inv. 1223, file 153, sheet 238.
7. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, p 194.
8. [Not in text]
9. Ibid., p 212.
10. Ibid., p 166.
11. [Not in text]
12. Ibid., p 178.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS OF THE 51ST ARMY AT STALINGRAD

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[Article published under the heading "On the 40th Anniversary of the Stalingrad Battle" by Col Gen (Ret) N. Trufanov: "The 51st Army in the Counteroffensive at Stalingrad"]

[Text] On the eve of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the 51st Army which I at that time commanded was occupying a 110-km long defensive zone between the Sarpa Lakes located to the south of the city. In the coming counteroffensive of the Stalingrad Front, the army had been assigned a very important role. Having concentrated its basic efforts in the narrows between Lakes Tsatsa and Barmantsak, it was to break through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army, support the committing of the mobile group consisting of the IV Mechanized and IV Cavalry Corps to the breach and, in developing the offensive with the main forces on the axis of Plodovitoye, Verkhne-Tsaritsynskiy and Sovetskiy, together with the mobile formations of the Southwestern Front, to conclude the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy grouping and with a portion of the forces form the inner perimeter of encirclement along the Myshkova River to Abganerovo.

With the 15th Guards Rifle Division which had arrived from the 57th Army the enemy defenses were to be broken through between Lakes Sarpa and Tsatsa and in cooperation with the 143d Rifle Brigade from the same army, the main forces of the VI Romanian Corps were to be surrounded and destroyed in the region of Dubovyy Ovrag.

In the preparation of our field force for the offensive, there were certain particular features. As is known, in October 1942, the enemy in the Stalingrad area was continuing fierce battles against the formations of the 62d and 64th Armies to capture the city. For this reason the drafts of recruits arriving for the commander of the front went basically to these armies. As a result, the formations and units of the 57th and 51st Armies which were to advance in the sector of the main thrust of the Stalingrad Front, were rather understrength.¹ The 302d Rifle Division had just two rifle regiments,² and these were far below strength and there was just one battalion in each of the three regiments of the 91st Division which was fighting on a broad front.

In truth, the enemy had also been significantly ground down in the course of the defensive by the Soviet troops to the south of Stalingrad. In the process of the particular offensive operations of the 51st and 57th Armies conducted from 29 September through 4 October, the insufficient strength of the Romanian units had been detected, their

inability to conduct nighttime operations and, most importantly, a reticence of the Romanians to fight for interests alien to them. Thus, one of the reports by the staff of the 4th Infantry Division stated: "The mood of the soldiers is low. The soldiers and officers do not understand the sense of participating in the battles on the Volga...."³ This forced the Nazi Command to put its own screening detachments behind the Romanian divisions.

The immediate preparations for the army-level offensive operation started after, on 21 October, the front commander, Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko, acquainted us, the army commanders, with the plans of Hq SHC for the counteroffensive, having cautioned us that in the aim of achieving surprise no written instructions would be given. From this day the combat capabilities of our army began to grow rapidly. At the beginning of October, one could scarcely call it an army as it had 13,765 men, that is, in terms of number equaled one full division. It included only the 91st Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen N. V. Kalinin) and the 302d (commander, Col Ye. F. Makarchuk) which numbered less than 2,100 men each.⁴ There were virtually no reinforcements. Now it was to receive the 126th Rifle Division (commander, Col D. S. Kuropatenko) and the 15th Guards Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen Ye. I. Vasilenko) from the 64th and 75th Armies. These formations had previously been strengthened and numbered, respectively, around 7,000 and 5,000 men. Of course, not very much, but for us at those times they represented a major force.

Our 1168th Cannon Artillery Regiment which had just four 152-mm howitzer cannons received another 5 guns.⁵ The army also received the 1105th Cannon and 85th Guards Howitzer Artillery Regiments which had 36 152- and 122-mm guns as well as the 125th Mortar Regiment (23 120-mm mortars).⁶ To the 1246th Tank Killer Regiment (14 guns) were added another two (the 491st and 492d) each of which had 20 guns.

From Central Asia, we were sent the IV Cavalry Corps of Lt Gen T. T. Shapkin and from the tank center of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] the IV Mechanized Corps of Maj Gen Tank Trps V. T. Vol'skiy.

Large forces were assembling. It was not merely a question of using them intelligently and efficiently. First of all, it was essential to define the troop grouping in the sector of the main thrust. The 126th and 302d Rifle Divisions were to be deployed between Lakes Tsatsa and Barmantsak, a mobile group was to be concentrated here consisting of the IV Mechanized and IV Cavalry Corps and an army artillery group was to be created consisting of the 1105th and 1168th Cannon Artillery Regiments and a group of GMCh [Rocket Launcher Units] (the 80th and 90th Guards Mortar [Rocket] Regiments).

In the sector of the army's main thrust, the divisions received the mission of breaking through enemy defenses between Lakes Tsatsa and Barmantsak, to capture the ridge of hills 6-7 km from its forward edge and support the committing of the army mobile group to the engagement. Subsequently, the 302d Rifle Division, by a strike in a southerly direction, was to assist the neighboring 91st Division on the left in defeating the enemy 4th Infantry Division.

The IV Mechanized Corps was to be committed to the engagement after the breakthrough of the first enemy position and to develop the offensive toward Sovetskiy, fighting on the inner encirclement perimeter, while the IV Cavalry Corps, in advancing toward Plodovitoye and Abganerovo, was together with the other troops to create the external encirclement perimeter.

The 126th Rifle Division was to be reinforced by tank and antitank regiments, by a guards mortar battalion and the 125th Mortar Regiment, while the 302d was to receive tank and antitank regiments, a guards mortar battalion and two battalions of the 85th Guards Howitzer Artillery Regiment. Thus, on the 6-km breakthrough sector we would have 13 close infantry support tanks per kilometer of front and around 42 guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and over. Since here the enemy had succeeded in creating a density of not more than 6-7 guns per kilometer of front and it had no tanks at all, we could count that a mighty force was to be concentrated against the 5th Chasseur Regiment of the 1st Romanian Division.

Before the front of the 51st Army were the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 5th Cavalry Division, units of the 18th Infantry Division and separate cavalry and tank regiments. The 18th Infantry Division was the strongest; it had arrived on the front on 7 November 1942 and occupied the defenses between the 51st and 57th Armies. Each of its companies numbered 200 men.⁷ In the other formations, each company included 100-120 men, but the regiments were of a two-battalion strength. The total balance of forces in the zone of the army on 20 November (see the table) was in favor of the army's troops.

Table

Balance of Men and Weapons in Zone of 51st Army on 20 November 1942

Men and Weapons	51st Army*	Enemy**	Ratio
Men	50,561	26,000	1.9:1
Tanks	198	80	2.5:1
Artillery pieces	255	183	1.4:1
Antitank weapons	175	111	1.6:1
Mortars	885	199	4.3:1
Machine guns	1,534	960	1.6:1

* TsAMO, folio 22, inv. 451, file 163, sheets 9-10.

** Ibid., inv. 453, file 7, sheets 277-278.

However, the terrain which in a war plays, as is known, an important role favored, if it can be so put, the enemy. The problem was that to the west of the Sarpa Lakes rose a ridge of 80-90-m hills occupied by the enemy and from which it could view the steppe almost as far as the Volga. This, in the first place, impeded the preparation of the operation, forcing us to make all troop movements and the delivery of supplies only at night or during foggy days and, secondly, threatened us with major losses in the offensive. I was particularly concerned by the fact that the zone of terrain most convenient for the movement of the tanks during the offensive ran between two elevations which had been turned into strongpoints. Even several gun positions which survived after the artillery softening-up could fire at the sides of the advancing tanks and this threatened to thwart the commitment of the mechanized corps to the engagement and hence, jeopardized the entire operation.

"This may not only go down in history, but might also bring us down," I said jokingly to my fellow servicemen then.

Then, in order to emerge honorably from the developing situation, the officers and generals of the army headquarters with particular care set to planning the army's operations, to organize dependable fire neutralization of the detected enemy firing positions and support the breakthrough of enemy defenses with minimum losses.

The army staff organized the preparation of the troops for the forthcoming operations. Having deployed to the south of Lake Sarpa, the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (commander, Col I. D. Burmakov) and a fortified area which were additionally turned over to us, we were able to put the 126th and 302d Rifle Divisions in the reserve and give them around 10 days for the preparations. The 15th Guards Rifle Division was preparing for the offensive in its own defensive zone. It successively put the rifle battalions into the rear. The shaping up of the cavalry formations was organized by the corps commander in the rest areas as the corps advanced under its own steam toward the front line. The mechanized corps was enroute virtually to the day of going over to the offensive and did not have time for combat preparations.

By the start of the offensive we had succeeded in creating the required supplies of ammunition, with the exception of the 120-mm mortar shells and the 122-mm shells; there were five fuelings for the vehicles.

During the night of 19 November, the assault groupings took up the jump-off position. The 126th and 302d Rifle Divisions replaced the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade which was put into my reserve. During the day, the member of the army military council, the Brig Commissar A. Ye. Khalezov, and I worked in the field, we checked the preparations of the troops for the offensive and only toward evening returned to the army command observation post [KNP]. Here we were greeted by the army chief of staff and he reported that the member of the front military council N. S. Krushchev and the deputy front commander Col Gen M. M. Popov had arrived.⁹

One must pay proper tribute to the army staff headed by Col A. M. Kuznetsov who, on the last day before the offensive, without halting for a single minute the painstaking work of supervising the preparations of the operation, the collecting of situational data, the carrying out and adjusting of operational calculations, had to make serious corrections in the organization of the KNP. Aside from all else, it was essential to prepare room for the command posts of the mechanized and cavalry corps which had not been able to do this on time.

Having reported to the representatives of the front headquarters on the state of the army's troops and the readiness for the offensive, I again went over with the corps commanders the procedure for committing their formations to the breakthrough and gave the necessary additional instructions to Col A. M. Kuznetsov and to the chief of the army's operations section Col K. N. Yanushkevich. After this, we could allow ourselves a brief rest.

Scarcely anyone slept at the KNP that night. We again checked whether everything had been done, we shared impressions and simply were excited. Everyone was particularly concerned by the fog which was becoming thicker toward morning.

"You could cut it with a knife," said one of the staff officers, concealing his concern behind a joke.

Then a new reason for concern appeared. In a regular testing of communications at 0600 hours on 20 November, it turned out that all the wire lines from the army KNP toward the Volga were out of order. The army signals chief had not considered that an entire tank avalanche would be coming through our zone (this had never happened before in the army). As a result, not only the cable communications with the corps were interrupted, but also the link with the front commander was out.

As they say, troubles come in large numbers. Immediately radio communications with the corps deteriorated and were undependable with the front staff. At 0700 hours, the situation had not changed. It was possible to control the troops in the first echelon, but there was no certainty that no changes would follow from the front staff since we did not know what decision had been taken by the front commander with the poor visibility. Nevertheless, the time for the start of the artillery softening-up was inexorably coming closer. The formation commanders and particularly the commanders of the artillery units were phoning and asking what to do.

We immediately assembled the military council. There was one question: to start the artillery softening-up according to the plan or set it back. The answers were the most contradictory. Some proposed recognizing the opinion of Gen M. M. Popov.

Should we ask the deputy commander of the front? This seemed logical. But this meant to put the responsibility off on someone else. Here I would like to say something about the relationships of a commander and a representative of the superior staff. The experience of the war showed that it was possible and proper to seek advice from a representative of a superior level, but first the commander should have his own plan and not only have it, but also defend it. The representative could, of course, cancel an improper plan, but this meant that a commander was clearly out of place. This has been well described in the book by K. K. Rokossovskiy "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty].¹⁰

Thus, I, as the chairman of the military council, announced by decision:

"The artillery softening-up and the infantry attack are to be commenced at the designated time: respectively at 0730 hours and 0830 hours."

I was supported by the military council member and by the other comrades. The decision was taken and Comrade A. Ye. Khalezov and I went off to report it to Gen M. M. Popov. He was also beset with doubts. We turned to the front military council member. I explained that the fog not only impeded our actions, but also would reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire and we, in possessing the initiative, could have an advantage.

The front military council member, having thought a moment, asked:

"Who is in command of the army?"

"I, Gen Trufanov."

"Then you take the decision as you are in command."

A. Ye. Khalezov and I walked in silence back to my dugout and we summoned the chief of staff and the commanders of the branches of troops. I ordered that the signal be

given for the start of the artillery softening-up, as was in the plan. I did not change my decision, now I had to carry it out and be responsible for it. Then it was 0730 hours. We stood listening, but it was silent all around. Only a battalion standing not far off was firing which sounded more like claps while the gun flashes were like a blinking light.

We became concerned. I ordered the artillery commander to make certain whether the command had reached all the artillery troops and whether they were all firing. Col N. I. Telegin reported that the artillery softening-up was going according to plan and that the sound and flames of the firing were being absorbed by the fog. But still it was difficult to suppress the feeling of uncertainty in oneself. To know that hundreds of guns were firing at not such a large area and not to see the bursts, not to be able to at least tentatively judge the effectiveness of fire—this, I must say, was hard. As for the commanders of the divisions, the closer they were to the end of the artillery softening-up, the more frequently they were asking what they should do when it ended.

These minutes were hard for me. If, having taken the decision to open fire, we risked disrupting certain new plans of the front's staff, having given the order for the attack, I would be sending thousands of men against possibly unsuppressed firing positions and this would mean blood, high casualties and possibly the aborting of the operation. Yes, the responsibility of a commander is great. He does not face bullets, he has a different burden, he must not only suppress his own doubts, but instill faith in victory in his subordinates. And I believed that the great work which we had done would not be in vain. The attack started according to the plan.

I listened to the reports of the division commanders. I realized that the infantry was in front, but I could not obtain an answer as to what line it had reached as the division commanders also could see nothing. From the reports of the regiment commanders they learned that the forward edge of the enemy defenses had been broken. This was also confirmed by wounded who arrived from the battle formations.

The representatives of the front were also concerned. They phoned constantly and this impeded the work of the officers in the operations section. But their concern was understandable. In skipping ahead, I should say that we succeeded in the breakthrough and our casualties were relatively low. Regardless of the fog, just nine tanks were damaged in crossing the minefields. The losses of the 302d Rifle Division considering those wounded during the first day of battle were just 33 men.¹¹

Around 0930 hours, I ordered the commanders of the divisions to begin shifting the KNP of the regiments. During this time, communications with the front was restored and Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko immediately demanded a report on the situation.

Having learned of the start of the operation at the designated time, the commander flew into a rage as, as it turned out, we had not received his order to put off the offensive by an hour or even more. Then Gen M. M. Popov was called to the phone. He had a difficult talk with the commander. But the main thing was now the front staff knew the situation. We were ordered to continue to act according to the plan, paying particular attention to the organized commitment of the mechanized corps.

Having returned to the KNP, I noticed that the fog was thinning and the outlines of tanks were appearing and then carts and people. By phone one after another the

commanders of the divisions began to report the successful battles for the commanding heights and soon thereafter we were able to observe this ourselves. By 1100-1200 hours, the immediate tasks of the rifle divisions had been carried out and conditions had been created for committing the mechanized corps. However, there was a delay,¹² and only by 1700 hours did the corps begin to carry out its task. On 23 November, it linked up with the tank units of the Southwestern Front in the region of Sovetskiy, Kalach.

The 15th Guards Rifle Division also fought successfully. Having completed the encirclement of the enemy, it was again transferred to the 57th Army which also subsequently received the IV Mechanized Corps. The 51st Army now was completely being used to create the external perimeter.

By 23 November, it was clear that there was no need to go over to the defensive along the Myshkova River as had been planned, since the routed Romanian units were retreating rather hurriedly ahead of the army's front and combat contact with them had been lost.¹³ The commander of the front ordered the 51st Army to move up to the Aksay Kurmoyarskiy River and capture Kotelnikovo. The advance was made along a broad front (about 200 km) in making fatiguing, long marches over several days and nights running.

During the first 10 days of December, the army troops undertook repeated attempts to capture Kotelnikovo, but without result. The enemy, in bringing up new forces and manning up the two Romanian corps using the pulled-back units, prepared a strong thrust in the aim of relieving its Stalingrad grouping. On 10 December, we received the order to go over to the defensive.

The army went over to the defensive along a front of up to 140 km, but its remaining three rifle divisions and two cavalry divisions were greatly weakened in the many days of battle. The receiving of the XIII Tank Corps somewhat improved our capabilities, but it also, incidentally, had been weakened and had less than 70 tanks. The difficulties in organizing the defensive were exacerbated by the fact that we had not succeeded in preparing the defenses in engineer terms.

On the morning of 12 December, the enemy grouping consisting of the 6th and 23d Tank Divisions reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks went over to the offensive along the Kotelnikovo--Stalingrad railroad. The blow was taken by the 302d Rifle Division, but was unable to halt the enemy. Having guessed the direction of the enemy's main thrust, I moved up the XIII Tank Corps which, in cooperation with the 302d Rifle Division, over 3 days of stubborn battles, in retreating from line to line, finally stopped the enemy on the Aksay Yesaulovskiy River and forced it to shift the thrust to another axis, to Verkhne-Kumskiy. Over this time the other army formations, in remaining at their positions or retreating only partially, gradually took up a position making it possible to strike in the flank of the enemy pushing toward Stalingrad. As a whole, the enemy lost about a week. The troops moved up by the front commander to the region of Verkhne-Kumskiy also played an important part in checking the rate of its advance. All of this ensured the deployment of the 2d Guards Army on the Myshkova River, where the foe was finally halted.

On 24 December, the 2d Guards and 51st Armies went over to an offensive in the general direction of Kotelnikovo. The operation developed successfully and by 31 December the army had reached the Salsk--Stalingrad Railroad in the area of Zimovniki. The Rostov Operation of the Southern Front commenced, and from 1 January 1943 this began to be called the Stalingrad Front.

Thus, the formations of the 51st Army made a definite contribution to the historic victory at Stalingrad, they showed the ability to rapidly break through the enemy defenses and exploit the success to a great depth and they showed tenacity and courage on the defensive. Having surmounted enormous difficulties, the army personnel demonstrated high military skill and wholehearted loyalty to the motherland and to the party, like all the heroic defenders of the city.

FOOTNOTES

1. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1978, p 27.
2. TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 405, inv. 9848, file 3, sheets 50-52.
3. Ibid., folio 220, inv. 451, file 163, sheet 2.
4. Ibid., folio 405, inv. 9848, file 3, sheets 2-10.
5. Ibid., file 53, sheet 15.
6. Ibid., file 3, sheets 62-72.
7. Ibid., folio 228, inv. 507, file 1, sheet 53.
8. [Not in text]
9. For more detail on this, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1961, pp 67-98.
10. K. K. Rokossovskiy, "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 129-130.
11. TsAMO, folio 405, inv. 9848, file 53, sheet 487.
12. For more detail on the commitment and operations of the IV Mechanized Corps, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1961, pp 78-79.
13. TsAMO, folio 228, inv. 507, file 1, sheets 61, 63.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS OF THE V MECHANIZED CORPS

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[Article published under the heading "On the 40th Anniversary of the Stalingrad Battle" by Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen Tank Trps (Ret) M. Shaposhnikov: "Combat Operations of the V Mechanized Corps West of Surovikino in December 1942"]

[Text] In the course of its concentration in the region of Perelazovskiy the V Mechanized Corps which had arrived from the reserve of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] as part of the Southwestern Front, received a combat order from the front's commander, Lt Gen N. F. Vatutin, in the morning of 6 December 1942. According to this order, the formation was to fight under the commander of the 5th Tank Army, Lt Gen P. L. Romanenko and to prepare to participate in the offensive.¹

Having received this order, the corps' commander, Maj Gen M. V. Volkov, went to see the army commander in order to report to him on the status of the units in the march and to clarify the task for the pending combat operations. At the army staff he received information on the concentration of a major enemy troop grouping in the region of Tormosin and this included the XLVIII Tank Corps (two tank and two infantry divisions). This grouping was to attack toward Kalach in the aim of relieving the 6th and units of the 4th Tank Armies which were surrounded in the region of Stalingrad; the group was to operate together with other formations from the Army Group Don.

The concentration of the Tormosin grouping was being covered by an infantry division which was on the defensive along a line of Sekretev, the southern bank of the Chir River and Surovikino. The enemy defenses had a developed system of engineer works and obstacles and was covered by mortar and machine gun fire.

The task of defeating the Tormosin enemy grouping was entrusted to the troops of the 5th Tank Army. Our corps² was to operate in its main sector.

The offensive was planned for 9 December. The operation plan envisaged that the army's rifle divisions during the first half of the day would cross the river, capture a bridgehead and support the committing of the corps to battle. The corps had received the mission of crossing the Chir and in cooperation with the rifle divisions by the end of the day to capture the line of Chuvilevskiy, Nizh. Kalinovka. Subsequently, it was to develop the offensive along the axes of Novoderbenovskiy and Verkhne-Aksenovskiy.

The corps made the march to the new combat area along two routes 70-75 km long during the night. It should be pointed out that the corps staff commenced the moving up of the head units earlier, keeping the reconnaissance and combat engineer subunits ahead. This provided an opportunity to be there ahead of the troops, to more dependably monitor the movement and their concentration in the new areas.

In the morning of 9 December, the 321st Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen I. A. Makarenko) and the 119th (commander, Col I. Ya. Kulagin) went over to the offensive. The 45th Mechanized Brigade (commander, Col M. V. Shutov) and the 49th (commander, Col S. P. Grechkin) from the corps first echelon were in the jump-off areas ready to cross the Chir and exploit the offensive on its southern bank. However, the rifle formations were unsuccessful chiefly due to the fact that our artillery was unable to dependably neutralize the enemy fire system. Particularly lethal was its flanking fire from Chuvilevskiy Farm and Nizh. Kalinovka.

In the existing situation, the army commander adopted a plan to resume the offensive in the morning of 10 December. But now our corps was put in the first echelon to break through the enemy defenses.

By the start of the offensive, the corps in its zone surpassed the enemy by more than 3-fold in terms of infantry and was approximately equal in terms of the quantity of artillery and mortars. The enemy did not have any tanks either on the forward edge or in its tactical depth. However, we were deprived of the possibility of using our tanks on a massed basis with the start of the offensive. The ice on the Chir River could not support heavy equipment and we lacked engineer equipment for building a crossing.

The situation was complicated by the fact that our units were armed with the English Mathilda and Valentine tanks supplied under Lend Lease. As is known, these combat vehicles had relatively weak armor, a low speed and poor cross-country capability over rugged terrain. We were particularly disconcerted by their poor cannon armament. They carried 40-mm cannons.

Because of this the corps command was confronted with the task of finding those means and procedures for fighting which would correspond to the existing situation and lead to success. And this task was carried out.

On 9 December, we learned that the enemy had two strongpoints on the southern bank of the Chir River at Chuvilevskiy and Nizh. Kalinovka and with the capturing of these the strength of its defenses in the sector Sekretev, Surovikino would undoubtedly collapse. In assessing the situation, the conclusion was drawn that without a massed tank attack a daytime offensive with the aim of capturing the designated strongpoints could be unsuccessful. For this reason, the corps commander upon the proposal of the staff, made a decision to capture them by a surprise nighttime attack using the forward motorized rifle battalions assigned from the 45th and 59th Mechanized Brigades.³ Here the offensive by the main forces was planned to start at dawn, as soon as the forward battalions had broken into the enemy strongpoints. In the aim of maintaining surprise, the artillery did not support their moving up to the river. However, the artillery troops were prepared to open fire in the event that the enemy detected the advance of the forward subunits.

We anticipated difficulties in the coming nighttime battle. For this reason, careful preparatory work was carried out in the battalions. Particularly careful inspections were made on the condition of the weapons and their lubricating in order to avoid a misfire in the 20-degree frost and the tightening of equipment so that nothing would make a noise. The commanders and political workers focused their work on increasing the combat mood of the men, particularly those who would participate in a nighttime battle for the first time.

With the onset of darkness on 9 September, the forward battalions in approach-march formations (each company in one-up platoon columns) began to move up along their own axes to the river. Officers from the corps and brigade staffs were supervising each axis. The battalion commanders were given the right to take a decision independently, considering the situation.

It should be said that after the battalions had gotten underway, for all of us there began a time of tense waiting. I recall how Maj Gen M. V. Volkov aptly described this state. When the watch hands passed midnight, he turned to me and said:


"I feel that the most difficult and even torturous condition begins for a commander when he is deprived of an opportunity to personally intervene into the course of events and is forced merely to wait for the results of soldier valor."

Some 60-90 minutes before dawn, the staff of the 45th Brigade received a radio signal from the commander of the forward battalion Maj P. I. Tkachenko that the forward subunits had reached the Chir River.

Subsequently the events developed as follows: (see the diagram). When the head 1st Motorized Rifle Company from the forward battalion of the 45th Brigade approached the river bank, from the enemy side illuminating rockets began bursting one after another. Having spotted the first rocket, the motorized rifle troops hit the dirt, but then, upon the signal from the battalion commander they rushed into the attack with such zeal that certain enemy firing positions were destroyed without even making a single shot. Behind this company the remaining subunits of the battalion crossed the river and burst into Chuvilevskiy Farm.

In the battle many soldiers from the battalion demonstrated bravery, valor and true soldier boldness. Let me give one of the many examples. When the 1st Motorized Rifle Company had reached the opposite river bank, under massed intense fire from an enemy pillbox, it was forced to hit the dirt. A critical situation had developed. Then the submachine gunner Zhadenov (as yet, like others, we have not been able to establish his first name and patronymic), having resolved to silence the enemy machine gun, asked his comrades to cover him. The fire from our machine guns was concentrated on the pillbox. At that moment the brave soldier rushed forward and while running was able to throw two grenades, one after another, into the firing slot. When the enemy pillbox fell silent, the squad commander Sgt Gulyayev stood up tall and commanded: "Behind me, forward, for the motherland!"

No one hesitated and all the soldiers moved forward, blazing a trail with grenades and machine gun and submachine gun firing. I would also point out that the nighttime raid succeeded because the enemy was taken by surprise. Not being able to withstand the pressure, in a panic it fled from the farm, leaving many corpses, wounded and various military equipment.



The Course of Combat Operations in the Zone of the V Mechanized Corps

The task of the forward motorized rifle battalion from the 49th Rifle Brigade was to take the bridge to the northwest of Nizh. Kalinovka and support the crossing of tanks over it. The brigade reconnaissance moving ahead of the battalion discovered that it was defended by a pair of guards. The experienced scouts succeeded in surprising the guards and eliminating them noiselessly. But then one other obstacle was discovered as the bridge had been prepared for detonation. However, the combat engineers who rushed up began to clear the bridge. When the job was about over, a battle started up in the region of Chuvilevskiy Farm, as a result of which the Germans took alarm in Nizh. Kalinovka.

Illuminating rockets were fired in the direction of the bridge, and after them the enemy opened up with heavy fire from machine guns and mortars. But it was too late. The battalion commander sent forward the tank company assigned to him which crossed the bridge and in deploying attacked the enemy without a halt. The motorized rifle subunits went over to the attack behind it.

The roar and clanking of the tracks of the attacking tanks, the tracer fire from the tank cannons and the machine guns threw the enemy into confusion. But when our submachine gunners and riflemen opened fire followed by the throwing of hand grenades, the Germans wavered and fled in panic from the farm also leaving many casualties and heavy combat equipment.

In the morning of 10 December, the main forces of the corps were committed to battle. The motorized rifle troops from the 45th Brigade crossed the Chir River over the ice and went over to an offensive against Novoderbenovskiy. This developed very slowly since the brigade's tank regiment, due to the lack of a crossing, had been unable to cross to the southern bank of the river. In addition, the right-hand 321st Rifle Division had also been unsuccessful. Its left-flank units, although eliminating the enemy bridgehead in the area of Sekretev, had been unable to cross the river. The brigade encountered particularly strong resistance in the area of elev. 102.6 and on 12 December was forced to halt the offensive.

The 49th Brigade went over to the offensive as soon as its forward battalion had broken into Nizh. Kalinovka. In the first half of the day, it had completely secured this strongpoint and by the end of 12 December had captured the line of elev. 102.7 and marker 96.1.

As our motorized rifle troops advanced deep into the enemy defenses, the enemy bridgehead in the area of Surovikino became more and more dangerous for the left flank and rear of the corps. A portion of the forces from the 119th Rifle Division had been fighting unsuccessfully for eliminating this. In the second half of the day of 10 December, to provide help in eliminating it the corps commander assigned a tank company with a party of submachine gunners under the command of Sr Lt F. P. Pogorelov who was personally given the task, having coordinated the company's actions with the division commander.

Some 30 minutes after receiving the mission, the company began to move toward Surovikino at maximum speed, without halting it broke through to the station from where its commander radioed: "We have attacked, we have reached the station and the enemy has taken flight." We contacted the staff of the 119th Rifle Division and gave the data on the success of our detachment. But the division for some reason

was slow in starting the offensive. Regardless of this, the company continued to advance along the rail line toward the oil plant. Here it was counterattacked by enemy tanks supported by heavy mortar fire and fire from antitank weapons and upon orders from Gen M. V. Volkov it returned to the initial position.

However, soon thereafter the Nazis were forced to flee Surovikino and this is why. When the detachment of F. P. Pogorelov pulled out of the town, one of the motorized rifle battalions from the 49th Brigade with a tank company, upon the orders of Col S. P. Grechkin, on 12 December attacked on the axis of elev. 117.4 and occupied it. Soon thereafter the 119th Rifle Division went over to the offensive. The enemy garrison, being surrounded in a semicircle, hurriedly abandoned Surovikino.

On the morning of 12 December, the corps commander committed his second echelon to battle for exploiting the offensive. The 50th Mechanized Brigade of Lt Col I. N. Tseplyayev received the task in cooperation with the 168th Tank Regiment (commander, Lt Col T. G. Karas') to advance in the boundary area between the 45th and 49th Brigades on the axis of Novoderbenovskiy and by the end of the day to take this population point.

In the course of the combat operations from 12 through 18 December, the enemy committed to battle against our corps a tank and infantry division from its XLVIII Tank Corps and intensified its operations. The rate of advance declined for our troops, the corps formations suffered losses and were forced to go over to the defensive.

On 19 December, the enemy went over to an offensive, having concentrated the basic efforts opposite the 50th Brigade and the 168th Regiment. The enemy tanks and infantry, with air support, undertook one attack after another. However, our tanks, artillery and motorized rifle troops put up stubborn resistance to the enemy and were able to drive off all attacks. On that day, our tank troops provided a good testing for the fire capability of the 40-mm cannons. It turned out that they penetrated the armor of the T-III and T-II tanks at a range of 400-500 m. Since our tanks, during the battle in the area of Novoderbenovskiy were in pits, the tank troops let the enemy approach to a close range and hit it hard.

The enemy, in suffering significant losses in tanks and personnel, was forced to halt its attacks and go over to the defensive. The front was stabilized to the southwest of Surovikino.

In the course of the combat operations against the Tormosin enemy grouping, many of our soldiers had shown courage and valor. Thus, in the battle on the approaches to Staroderbenovskiy Farm, the commander of the machine gun crew, Sgt N. G. Lobachev suffered a concussion. Coming to late at night, he discovered killed Nazis not far from himself. Taking one of their submachine guns, Lobachev made his way slowly along the bank toward the farm where the firing was particularly heavy. Suddenly he spotted a group (5 or 6 men) of Nazis with a light machine gun making their way into the rear of our battalion. The soldier crawled to them and destroyed them down to the last man. In subsequent battles, Nikolay Gavrilovich Lobachev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Indicative of the high moral-combat qualities of the men was their desire to go into battle as communists. Just during the time of the battles against the Tormosin enemy grouping, 195 men in the corps were admitted to the party and 93 persons entered the Komsomol.

Among the first to receive a party card in those days on the battlefield was Sgt Gloda. When he was being bandaged, the medical aid station was counterattacked by up to a platoon of enemy submachine gunners. Even from a distance they could see the white flag with the red cross and for this reason they approached boldly standing full upright. The situation became very serious and everyone was threatened with death for the Nazis, as is known, did not spare wounded Red Armymen.

Sgt Gloda did not hesitate. From the wounded he organized a small group, he quickly established an all-round defense and ordered: "Fire is to be opened only upon my command." When the Nazi butchers had reached a distance of several-score meters, he commanded: "Fire." Not a single Nazi was left alive. After this the sergeant led all the wounded to the southern edge of Chuvilevskiy Farm where he was presented his party card....

From 22 December, the V Mechanized Corps turned over the defensive zone to the 321st Rifle Division and from the 26th took part in liberating the northern regions of Rostov Oblast from the Nazi invaders.

In conclusion it can be said that the V Mechanized Corps, in advancing in the main sector of the 5th Tank Army, played an important role in defeating the basic forces of the XLVIII Tank Corps which was to participate in the offensive to liberate the surrounded enemy troops at Stalingrad. In his memoirs Field Mar Mannstein wrote: "...The enemy on 10 December with large forces again attacked our front to the west of the Don on the lower courses of the Chir River. It became clear that there could be no question of freeing the XLVIII Tank Corps from this sector so that it could advance together with the LVII Tank Corps from the Don-Chir bridgehead."⁴

The combat operations in the area of Surovikino showed that many of our commanders and staffs at that time still had little-mastered the method of organizing an offensive without a halt and with preparations in a limited time. The staffs did not always know the situation and condition of the troops in the course of the fluid combat.

It should also be emphasized that when the mobile formations did not have the necessary engineer men and equipment, this told negatively on the rate of advance of the formations and often caused us to lose the surprise factor.

The experience of the battles conducted also showed that the greatest success in combat operations particularly at night, were achieved by those subunits the commanders of which showed a maximum of reasonable initiative and had personal courage.

FOOTNOTES

1. Here and below the data are given from the "Report of Combat Operations of the V Mechanized Corps" (TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 363, inv. 32059, file 1, sheets 1-30).
2. The author of the article at that time was the corps chief of staff.—Editors.
3. Each brigade included three motorized rifle battalions of 700 men each and a tank company (36 tanks). The corps tank regiments (the 168th and 188th) each had two tank battalions. As a total the corps had 193 tanks.

4. E. Mannstein, "Uteryannyye pobedy" [Lost Victories], Voenizdat, 1957, p 324.

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MULTINATIONAL SOVIET ARMED FORCES FROM 1920 TO 1939

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[Article published under the heading "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col N. Makarov: "The Organizational Development of the USSR Multinational Armed Forces from 1920 to 1939"]

[Text] In contrast to the old Russian Army in which the representatives of many nationalities of the former Tsarist Russia were not permitted at all,¹ the Red Army from the very outset was organized as an army of friendship and fraternity of peoples united by the common goal of a struggle for liberation from social and national suppression. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the proclaiming of national equality by Soviet power in economic, sociopolitical and cultural life, as well as the practical measures by the Leninist party and Soviet government in the designated areas were that basis on which the task of involving the previously suppressed nations in the defense of the socialist fatherland was carried out.

Our party did not consider that the Soviet Army should be purely Russian and for this reason V. I. Lenin pointed to the need of broadening and strengthening the national formations in it. In a letter to K. G. Ordzhonikidze on 13 February 1922 and written on the eve of the opening of the Second All-Georgian Congress of Soviets, he [Lenin] in particular, demanded that the congress adopt a decision on the obligatory reinforcing of the Georgian Red Army and that the designated decision be carried out in fact. "This," the leader of the party wrote, "is politically absolutely essential...."² The efforts of the Communist Party aimed at organizing multinational armed forces led to a situation where even by the end of the Civil War the Red Army had 77.6 percent Russians, 13.7 percent Ukrainians, 4 percent Belorussians and 4.7 percent representatives of other nationalities.³

Of great importance in the further broadening of the Red Army's multinational composition was the formation of the USSR in December 1922. The 60th anniversary of this event is being widely celebrated this year as "a noteworthy event in the life of the Soviet people and proof of the triumph of the Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU and the historic accomplishments of socialism."⁴ In utilizing the favorable conditions which arise as a result of the formation of the USSR, the 12th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress (April 1923) demanded that the workers of all nationalities be involved in the armed defense of the Soviet Union.⁵ The task posed

by the party congress was not only of defense significance, but also of great political importance as it broadened the social base of the Red Army and increased its reserves. "Our Red Army," said M. V. Frunze, "has never been viewed by us as 'Russian' or as an army of one nationality. The Great Russian nationality has comprised and does comprise its nucleus and the basis of all its might. However, this has not removed and does not remove from all the other Soviet nationalities the rights and duties of defending the Soviet land with weapons in hand. This duty should be extended evenly and on principles of complete equality ultimately even to those nationalities which previously were not required to do military service."⁶

The nationality question in the military organizational development since that time has held a particular place in the activities of the Communist Party, the state and military bodies of our nation. On 20 March 1923, the RVSR⁷ [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] sent out to all the chiefs of the political directorates in the military districts a special directive which emphasized the importance for the Red Army of resolving the nationality question on a practical level. The RVSR demanded that not only comradely tension be shown to the national minorities, but also particular sensitivity and that any grounds for suspicion and mistrust be eliminated. The command personnel was "to imbue in the awareness of the armed representatives the idea of true equality and fraternity of all nationalities."⁸ At the beginning of 1924, the Political Directorate of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council], together with the staff of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] worked out a plan of measures which together with the party and soviet bodies in the national regions of the USSR was to begin preparing the representatives of all the Soviet nationalities for military service and also outlined measures to train military personnel and organize national units.⁹ This document lay at the basis of a five-year plan approved in November 1924 by the USSR RVS for integrating the nationalities in the RKKA. This was reinforced in legislation at the Third Congress of USSR Soviets in May 1925. The congress instructed the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and the USSR SNK [Soviet of People's Commissars] to adopt the appropriate measures to carry out the planned program for national formations, as meeting the interests of the Soviet peoples in the area of defending their common socialist fatherland.¹⁰

As a result of the great work carried out to prepare the fraternal Soviet peoples to defend the victories of October, in the nation conditions were prepared for the adopting of a national law on compulsory military service on 18 September 1925.¹¹ In accord with its provisions, for the first time the indigenous nationalities of the Karelian, Buryat-Mongol and Yakut ASSR's were to be inducted into the RKKA,¹² and on Georgian territory, all citizens with a year of birth of 1903 (with the exception of the Adzhars and Muslims from Akhaltsikhskiy and Akhalkalakskiy districts).¹³ In Azerbaijan, the induction of the indigenous population for military service started in 1927, and for the Kazakhs,¹⁴ the mountain people of the Northern Caucasus and Dagestan,¹⁵ the Abkhazians and Adzhars¹⁶ in 1928.

It should be pointed out that the inducting of the indigenous population into the RKKA was carried out in 1928 in all the national areas of the USSR (with the exception of Central Asia). Out of the 583,500 men in the total number of inductees, Russians made up 63.80 percent, Ukrainians were 18.96; Belorussians 5.40; Jews 2.10; Tatars 1.68; Georgians 1.30; Armenians 1.20; Germans 0.79; Poles 0.72; Mordovians 0.63; Turkic (Azerbaijanis) 0.46; Chuvash 0.40; Komis 0.26; Bashkirs 0.22; Moldavians 0.21; Karelians 0.18; Cheremis 0.17; Votiaks (Udmurts) 0.16; Ossetians 0.15; mountain people

of the Northern Caucasus 0.15; Kazakhs 0.12; Latvians 0.10; Estonians 0.10; Koreans 0.07; Buryat-Mongols 0.06; Lithuanians 0.04; Kalmyks 0.04; others 0.53.¹⁷

In the Central Asian republics, the preparing of the indigenous population for military service started more slowly. Here up until 1931, recruitment for the Red Army was basically from the organized youth and volunteers, as the attempt at mass induction in Uzbekistan in 1924, without considering the local conditions and proper preparations had not provided positive results.¹⁸

In the aim of accelerating the training of the youth for compulsory military service (this was a completely new matter for the Central Asian peoples), mass political work among the population began to be carried out more actively there. The course of this work was repeatedly discussed in the party and soviet bodies of the republics and at plenums of the RVS of the Central Asian Military District. In 1930, the Komsomol took sponsorship of the inductees. On 27 January 1931, the Executive Commission of the Central Asian Bureau of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], having discussed the question of the results of recruitment for the Red Army from the local basic nationalities, judged the induction in 1930 to be completely satisfactory and adopted a decision to work out a law "Governing Compulsory Military Service" for the Central Asian republics.¹⁹ The central committees and obkoms of the national communist parties were instructed to draw up this law through the TsIK of the republics and the RVS of the Central Asian Military District was to put it into effect within 1 month.

In 1931, the Central Asian republics began induction into the army of youth from the indigenous nationalities on a basis of compulsory recruitment and this ended the accepting of volunteers in the RKKA (from 1933).²⁰

The great achievements of the Communist Party in carrying out the Leninist nationality policy led to a situation where at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's there was a significant increase in the number of non-Russian citizens being inducted into the Red Army. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia alone, in 1935, 5,252 persons were inducted from the indigenous nationalities; in 1936 the figure was 3,662, in 1937 7,121, in 1938 17,699 and in 1939 55,295 persons.²¹ Among the 55,295 persons inducted in 1939, there were 24,722 Uzbeks, 18,248 Kazakhs, 4,470 Tajiks, 4,183 Turkmens and 3,672 Kirghiz.²²

In all the units where non-Russian personnel was serving, a study of Russian was organized for them. A knowledge of it helped in more rapidly mastering military affairs. In addition, through the language of Pushkin and Lenin the numerous representatives of the national borderlands became acquainted with the rich treasures of Russian and world literature.

In the interests of the organizational development of the multinational USSR Armed Forces, the Communist Party adopted measures to train command and political personnel from among the citizens of all the Soviet nationalities. In 1923, the contingent of non-Russian youth in the military schools was enlarged and the number of national military schools was increased from 7 to 13. According to the Order of the USSR RVS "On the Nationalizing of Military Schools" of 9 June 1924, on the basis of the already-existing schools, special schools were to be set up for training command and political personnel in the national languages. These included: the Ukrainian Infantry

School for Red Sergeants imeni the VUTsIK, the Ukrainian Cavalry School imeni S. M. Budenny, the Belorussian Unified School imeni M. V. Frunze, the Red Communards School (in Moscow), the International Military School (in Leningrad), the Tartar-Bashkir School imeni TatTsIK, the Kazakh Military School imeni KirTsIK (in Orenburg), the Tashkent Unified Command School imeni V. I. Lenin, the Central Asian Unified Military School, the Cavalry School for the Mountain Nationalities of the Northern Caucasus imeni V. I. Lenin and the three Transcaucasian National Military Schools (Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani). For the training of political workers there were the international Turkic (Kazan), the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani military-political schools, the national departments under the Tashkent Unified Command School imeni V. I. Lenin and in the military-political school of the Northern Caucasus Military District, as well as two Ukrainian companies in the military-political school of the Kiev Military District.

Also international in their composition were the regimental schools which trained junior commanders from the representatives of many nations and nationalities of our country.

Over 6 years (from 1920 through 1926), the size of the non-Russian command personnel in the RKKA increased from 18 percent to 28.3 percent (and for junior commanders almost up to 40 percent). The number of political workers from 1920 through 1925 rose from 26.5 to 34.9 percent.²³ In 1928-1931, the number of non-Russians in the military schools increased further.

One of the most important areas of Lenin's nationality policy in military organizational development was the founding of national units. In 1923, in the Transcaucasian republics, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian divisions were established (from brigades). At the end of 1924, the Second Georgian Territorial Division was organized. In 1929, the Abkhazian Cavalry Squadron was included in it.²⁴

In the Ukraine, the 95th, 96th, 99th and 100th Territorial Rifle Divisions were reorganized as national ones. In Belorussia, the 2d Territorial Rifle Division became a national one.²⁵ In the Volga Military District a Tatar-Bashkir regiment was created as part of the 1st (Kazan) Rifle Division and a Bashkir cavalry squadron was organized.²⁶ These national units of the RKKA were manned on the same levels as the "number" ones (or, as they were then called the "Russian" ones).²⁷ The only difference was in the national composition (they were basically formed from persons of the indigenous nationalities).

Where compulsory service had not been introduced previously, the process of organizing national formations was carried out gradually. Initially, small subunits and units were created and then, as the appropriate conditions were prepared, larger units and formations were formed. For example, at the end of 1924, a rifle battalion, three cavalry squadrons and a cavalry battalion, one rifle company and one pack-horse battery were formed from the national armies of Bukhara and Khorezma which had been included in the RKKA and from volunteers in Central Asia. Later two cavalry squadrons were formed in Dagestan and six cavalry platoons from the mountain nationalities from Northern Caucasus (in 1927 these were reduced into a cavalry regiment),²⁸ a separate chasseur battalion in Karelia, a separate cavalry battalion in Kazakhstan,²⁹ a separate cavalry squadron in the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, a separate rifle company with a cavalry platoon in the Yakut ASSR and others.³⁰

After carrying out the demarcation lines in Central Asia, the national military organizational development here entered a new phase. In 1926-1930, two Uzbek and two Turkmen cavalry regiments were formed as well as a separate Kirghiz cavalry squadron (subsequently, reorganized as a battalion) and a Tajik cavalry squadron (in 1927, reorganized as a separate mountain rifle battalion). In 1930, the Central Asian party bodies posed the question of forming a Karakalpak cavalry battalion.³¹ By 1934, the separate Uzbek rifle battalion had become a mountain rifle regiment, while the separate Tajik rifle battalion was now a Tajik cavalry regiment.

As the youth of the indigenous nationalities was prepared for military service, the national units in Central Asia were developed into larger formations. In 1931-1934, the separate Turkmen cavalry brigade (with three regiments and a horse-artillery battalion) was formed as well as a Kirghiz territorial cavalry brigade (two regiments), a mixed Uzbek brigade (two cavalry regiments, a mountain rifle regiment and a horse-artillery battalion), a separate Tajik brigade (two mounted rifle regiments, a cavalry battalion and a pack-mountain battery).³² In 1935, the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik mountary-cavalry divisions were fielded.³³ All these formations were territorial.

The national formations were one of the proven forms for establishing political and national equality and were vivid proof of the ensuring of equal rights and obligations for all the Soviet peoples in defending the socialist fatherland. They played a major role in acquainting the non-Russian peoples with compulsory military service and in preparing the national military personnel and teaching military affairs to the youth of all the Union and autonomous republics, the autonomous oblasts and national districts.

But the need for national formations declined as socialist nationality relationships developed and the friendship of Soviet peoples grew stronger as well as a result of the changes which occurred of a socioeconomic nature and the increased political and cultural level of the youth in the national borderlands (Russian more and more became a language of international intercourse) and the indoctrinating of the Soviet people in a spirit of socialist internationalism. Under the new historical conditions, when the international situation required the creation of a modern mass, well-trained regular army, the need arose of reorganizing the national units. In accord with the Decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK "On the National Units and Formations of the RKKA" of 7 March 1938, the national units, formations, military schools and institutions of learning were reorganized as all-Union ones with extraterritorial staffing and a change of location.³⁴

The citizens of all the Union republics, regardless of their national affiliation, began to be called up for military service in accord with the new Law Governing Universal Military Service adopted in September 1939 by the USSR Supreme Soviet. As a result, the Red Army was further strengthened as a unified international force.

Thus, during the interwar period, the Communist Party carried out enormous work to implement Lenin's nationality policy in Soviet military organizational development. This policy proved fully effective in the Great Patriotic War and by the start of this all the nations and nationalities had been prepared with weapons in hand to defend the socialist fatherland.

The men of all the Soviet nationalities are proud of their belonging to the glorious Soviet Armed Forces and, in responding in deeds to the high praise of their military service given by L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, are honorably carrying

out their constitutional obligation and are vigilantly and securely guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people who are building communism. The 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR has been marked by the Army and Navy personnel with new successes in military and political training and by increased combat readiness.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the Tsarist Army service was not permitted or serious restrictions were placed on the service of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Azerbaijani, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Jews, Karelians, Finns, Permiaks (Komis), Maris, Chuvash, Votiaks (Udmurts), Buryat-Mongols, Oyrots as well as Yakuts and other peoples of the Russian North (see M. Rymshan and K. Aleksinskiy, "Natsional'nyye formirovaniya v burzhuznykh gosudarstvakh i v SSSR" [National Formations in Bourgeois States and in the USSR], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1928, p 24; "V. I. Lenin i sovremennyye problemy zashchity sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin and Contemporary Problems of Defending the Socialist Fatherland], Moscow, Izd. VPA, 1980, p 211; A. P. Artem'yev, "Bratskiy voyvoy soyuz narodov SSSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" [The Fraternal Combat Alliance of the Soviet Peoples in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Mysl', 1975, p 39).
2. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, pp 388-389.
3. "Partiya i Armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 76.
4. "O 60-y godovshchine obrazovaniya SSSR" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 3.
5. See: "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezдов, konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], 8th Edition, Supplemented and Revised, Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 441.
6. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voenizdat, 1965, p 214.
7. Up to 13 July 1923, the functions of the higher military bodies of the USSR were entrusted to the RSFSR military bodies.
8. See A. Ya. Vishnevskiy, "Shkola družby narodov" [The School of Friendship of Peoples], Dushanbe, 1966, pp 28-29.
9. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 9, inv. 13, file 225, sheets 2-4.
10. "S"yezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetsskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik. Sbornik dokumentov 1917-1936 gg." [Congresses of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Collection of Documents 1917-1936], Vol III, Moscow, Gosyurizdat, 1960, pp 83-84.

11. For more detail, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1975, pp 121-125.
12. "Sbornik zakonov SSSR" [Collection of USSR Laws], 1925, No 55, Article 407, No 57, Article 428; TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute], folio 17, inv. 31, file 49, sheet 25; TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 3, file 2927, sheet 60.
13. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 2, file 58, sheet 102.
14. Some 34,790 young Kazakhs were invited to the induction centers (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 1002, sheet 3), some 33,658 persons underwent medical examination (TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 3, file 405, sheet 45), and 53.63 percent were considered fit for military service (TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 3, file 375, sheets 22, 29-30). At the end of 1928, over 10,000 Kazakhs were called up for military service through nontroop proceedings (TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 3, file 375, sheet 4). "By this, Kazakhstan has become part of the general system of the USSR Armed Forces under equal conditions with the workers from the other fraternal republics," emphasized the Fourth Session of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee in December 1928 (ibid.).
15. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 25, file 47, sheet 90; TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 905, sheet 15; file 1349, sheet 8; inv. 2, file 468, sheet 27; folio 9, inv. 3, file 405, sheets 45, 47. Some 20,842 men were invited to the induction points (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 905, sheet 18; file 1002, sheet 3).
16. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 3, file 405, sheet 49.
17. Ibid., sheets 80, 81.
18. For example, in a number of places in Bukhara, induction into the army was greeted by the local population at that time with disapproval (see the Report of the Political Directorate of the RKKa to the Organizational and Allocation Department of the VKP(b) Central Committee of 4 March 1925. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 68, file 420, sheet 6).
19. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 24, file 32, sheet 60.
20. TsGASA, folio 25895, inv. 1, file 67, sheet 78.
21. Ibid., file 83, sheet 240.
22. Ibid., sheet 238.
23. Ibid., folio 4, inv. 1, file 206, sheet 100; inv. 3, file 2928, sheets 15, 18-20, 24.
24. Ibid., file 1422, sheet 16.
25. Ibid., file 335, sheet 38. While in September of 1923 there were only 140 persons in the 2d Rifle Division of Belorussians (TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 17, file 175, sheet 118), in January 1929, here 2,848 Belorussians were already serving (TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 13, file 649, sheet 53).

26. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 68, file 420, sheet 5; TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 271, sheets 10, 11, 13.
27. Ibid., sheet 6.
28. "Problemy gosudarstvennogo stroitel'stva v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti" [Problems of State Construction in the First Years of Soviet Power], p 235. The first separate Dagestan cavalry squadron consisting of 135 men in organizational terms was part of the 13th Rifle Division (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 335, sheet 36). On 18 June 1924, the Presidium of the USSR RVS adopted a decision to organize a second Dagestan cavalry squadron (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 61, sheet 216) and this was carried out in 1927 (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 525, sheets 1-2). In March 1930, the Free Cavalry Regiment of the Mountain Nationalities of Northern Caucasus and Dagestan was renamed the Separate Composite Cavalry Regiment of the Mountain Nationalities of Northern Caucasus and Dagestan imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze (see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1975, p 120).
29. In September 1930, the party and soviet bodies of the Kazakh ASSR requested that the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR RVS change it into a regiment (TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 1349, sheet 8, 9-11).
30. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 54, sheet 278.
31. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 24, file 28, sheet 128; file 335, sheet 34.
32. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, file 1080, sheet 18; folio 25895, inv. 1, file 59, sheets 63, 64.
33. Ibid., folio 25895, inv. 1, files 556, 557, 558.
34. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz. Dokumenty 1917-1981" [The CPSU on the Soviet Armed Forces. Documents 1917-1981], Voenizdat, 1981, pp 286, 287.

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WARTIME ORDNANCE SUPPLY FOR OPERATIONS IN 1944

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 51-53

[Article published under the heading "Documents and Materials" by Col Gen Arty (Ret) I. Volkotrubenko*: "Supporting Soviet Troops with Arms and Ammunition in Operations During 1944"]

[Text] In 1944, the heroic working class and kolkhoz peasantry of our nation, under the leadership of the Communist Party, achieved new labor successes and materially supported the carrying out of the successive offensive operations by the Soviet Army along the entire Soviet-German Front. The plants of the people's commissariats for ordnance (People's Commissar D. F. Ustinov) and ammunition (People's Commissar B. L. Vannikov) operated at full capacity. There was also a continuous process of the qualitative improvement in the military products, their deliveries to the troops increased, there was reduced production for those types of weapons and ammunition the need for which had declined while obsolete models were taken out of production.

Thus, in 1944, in comparison with 1943, the deliveries of rifles and carbines declined by 29 percent, for submachine guns by 3 percent, light machine guns by 11 percent and antitank rifles by 77 percent. The deliveries of 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, in comparison with 1943, declined, respectively, by 92 and 82 percent. The production of the 1938 model of 122-mm howitzers, in comparison with 1943, declined by 8 percent, and for the 152-mm howitzer cannons by 75 percent. The production of 50-mm mortars, the 1937-model 45-mm antitank guns and the 1927 76-mm infantry cannons was completely halted. Starting in 1942, the 1931-model 203-mm howitzers were not supplied by industry.¹

At the same time, there was increased deliveries of more modern models and mass production of new types of weapons was developed. Thus, in 1944, in comparison with 1943, the deliveries of the new models of medium machine guns increased by 12 percent, anti-aircraft cannons by 16 percent, 1942-model 45-mm antitank guns by 11 percent, the ZIS-2 57-mm cannons by 14 percent and the ZIS-3 76-mm divisional cannons by 23 percent.²

* During the period described, Gen I. I. Volkotrubenko was the first deputy chief of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU).--Editors.

The artillery units began receiving more powerful guns and mortars. In particular, in 1944, industry supplied the troops with 593 1943-model 160-mm mortars, 341 1944-model BS-3 cannons (100-mm) and 258 1943-model D-1 howitzers (152-mm).³

The reduced deliveries of rifles and mortars can be explained by the saturating of the army with these types of weapons. The removal of the 1937- and 1927-model 45- and 76-mm cannons from production was caused by their replacement with modern artillery systems. As a whole, the reduction in the delivery of guns to the troops by 28 percent and by 88 percent for mortars in 1944 was due not to the reduced capability of industry, but rather to the sharp decline in the need for these weapons in the troops. Suffice it to say that the central depots of the People's Commissariat of Defense [NKO] on 1 January 1944, there was in reserve a significant number of artillery and mortar ordnance of varying caliber.

The amount of weapons, in comparison with 1943, continued to increase: by 1.45-fold for rifles, by 2-fold for machine guns, by 1.4-fold for mortars and guns, and by 2.7-fold for automatics.⁴

In the fierce battles of 1943 at Stalingrad, the Northern Caucasus, the Kursk salient, in the battle for the Dnepr and in other operations, a significant amount of ammunition was consumed. As a result of this, their supplies by the start of 1944, in comparison with the supplies at the start of the war, had increased by just 8 percent, and for the most widely used calibers had even declined: for the 122-mm and 203-mm howitzer rounds, respectively, by 4- and 2.3-fold; for the 152-mm by 3.5-fold. At the same time, there was an increase in the production of other types of ammunition. Thus, the deliveries of 37-mm antiaircraft rounds increased by 18-fold, for the 82-mm mortar shells by 1.7-fold and for the 120-mm mortar shells by 7.3-fold.⁵

Such a disproportion (the reduced output of some ammunition and the increase in other types) arose due to the fact that at the outset of the war the supplies of various types of ammunition were uneven. Thus, the Main Artillery Directorate (chief, Mar Arty N. D. Yakovlev) and the Artillery Supply Service were confronted with the task of more evenly supplying the fronts with all types of ammunition in the forthcoming operations.

In 1944, the nation's Armed Forces possessed the following resources of weapons and ammunition (in the troops, in the reserve of the center, and supplied by industry in the current year): almost 15 million rifles and automatics, 806,700 machine guns, 513,000 guns and mortars (not including 50-mm),⁶ almost 13 billion cartridges for firearms and 256 million shells and mortar rounds.⁷

In the course of the 1944 operations, the troops received: 1,371,000 rifles and automatics, 54,300 machine guns, 30,000 guns and mortars, 2 billion cartridges for firearms and 51.1 million artillery and mortar shells.⁸

The average consumption of artillery and mortar shells in relation to those on hand was 54 percent, but for certain calibers, for example, the 76-mm divisional and 122-mm howitzer rounds, this was higher, 65 and 77 percent. The most ammunition (in relation to the available) was consumed by the fronts in the Budapest (95 percent), Crimean and Lwow-Sandomierz (80 percent) operations. In the remaining operations consumption varied from 10 to 60 percent.⁹

The supplying of ammunition to the troops of the fronts in the various operations had specific difficulties. Thus, in the advance of the Soviet troops at Leningrad and Novgorod, there were definite difficulties in organizing the rear services for the Leningrad Front (chief of artillery supply, Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv G. D. Golobev). Virtually all the artillery dumps were located in Leningrad due to the lack of depth in the front and army rears. The front, army and often the organic [troop] rear areas were merged into one. In the 2d Assault Army (chief of artillery supply, Col G. P. Karazeyev), the ammunition was delivered by sea to the Oraniyenbaum staging area and this involved numerous difficulties. On the Volkhov Front (chief of artillery supply, Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv S. F. Vasilenko), delivery of ammunition was complicated by the fact that in the rear area there were numerous swampy areas and few roads.

During the period of the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, ammunition was delivered under the difficult conditions of spring mud. In individual sectors, ammunition was delivered to the troops by air using the PO-2 aircraft. The artillery ordnance service was directed by Maj Gens Engr-Tech Serv N. Ye. Manzhurin and P. L. Rozhkov (the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts).

Equal difficulties arose in supplying the troops with weapons and ammunition in the Crimean Operation. For delivering ammunition to the Fourth Ukrainian Front (chief of artillery supply, Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv G. A. Kolosov), crossings built over the Sivash were used and the Separate Maritime Army (chief of artillery supply, Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv M. P. Smakhtin) received them over an involved route across the Kerch Strait.

In the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, the 14th Army (chief of artillery supply, Col I. S. Sychev) of the Karelian Front received ammunition by sea at the port of Murmansk and then the ammunition was delivered to the troops by various types of transport including motor vehicles, horses and reindeer.

The operations of the Soviet troops which developed in 1944 on the front from the Barents to the Black Seas were promptly supplied both with weapons and ammunition. Here great work was carried out by the front, army and divisional artillery dumps which handled the weapons and ammunition being delivered to the troops. While in 1942, 78,500 railroad cars with ammunition and artillery weapons were dispatched to the troops, in 1943 the figure was already 132,000. For this reason the number of army and front artillery dumps increased from 154 (1953) to 186. The turnover of artillery supply freight for the fronts was 301,563 carloads and for the army freight 513,819 carloads.¹⁰

In 1944, the repairmen did excellent work in all the elements of the artillery ordnance supply. They repaired around 12 million rifles and automatics, over 1 million machine guns and 712,600 guns and mortars.¹¹

Regardless of the high consumption of ammunition in the operations, its resources did not decline, but rather increased due to the heroic efforts of the Soviet rear workers. Thus, the availability of ammunition on 1 January 1945, in comparison with the amount on 1 January 1944, increased by 9.3 percent for firearms and by 8.5 percent for artillery and mortar shells. Here the supply for the basic artillery systems was significantly higher: the increase was by 28 percent for the 76-mm divisional cannons and by 53 percent for the 122-mm howitzers.¹²

Ammunition supply for the troops was carried out frequently under difficult situations and with a shortage for individual systems. Rigid control over the consumption of ammunition, the combating of losses and the broad maneuvering of the center's reserves provided an opportunity for the GAU to promptly and correctly balance the supply of all types of ammunition for the fronts.

Due to the intense heroic work by the plants of the people's commissariats of ordnance and ammunition, to the constant concern of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the State Defense Committee in 1944, the Soviet Army was fully supplied with all types of artillery weapons and ammunition. The GAU constantly felt the concern and support of the State Defense Committee and the General Staff as well as the effective help from the rear bodies, particularly the military communications directorate.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 81, inv. 12079, file 47, sheets 23-25.
2. Ibid., sheet 51.
3. Ibid., sheet 53.
4. Ibid., file 48, sheet 64.
5. Ibid., file 49, sheet 68.
6. Ibid., file 48, sheet 112.
7. Ibid., file 68, sheet 152.
8. Ibid., file 150, sheet 180.
9. Ibid., sheets 184-186.
10. Ibid., file 84, sheets 71, 72.
11. Ibid., inv. 12165, file 476, sheets 39-62.
12. Ibid., inv. 12079, file 49, sheet 172; file 50, sheet 164.

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COMMENTS ON PRESENT-DAY ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN FORMER SS PERSONNEL

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[Article published under the heading "Against the Bourgeois Falsifiers of History" by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col (Res) N. Volkov: "The Danger of Increased Activities of Former SS Personnel"]

[Text] The monstrous crimes of the SS (German Schutzstaffeln or security detachments) in the course of World War II in the regions of the USSR temporarily occupied by the Nazi troops particularly, in the other regions of Europe and in Germany itself caused the International Tribunal in Nuremberg to judge this organization as criminal.¹ It included the Gestapo (the State Secret Police), the units guarding the concentration camps, the subunits of the so-called Security Service and the SS troops. However, regardless of such a judgment, at present associations of former SS personnel are active in the FRG, being an important part of the reactionary forces.

The rise of the SS dates back to the development of Naziism in Germany. Even in 1923, in Munich, paramilitary detachments were organized for guarding Hitler and his closest associates and these were the start of the SS organization.

In 1929, these detachments had a total of 280 persons in their ranks. However, the anticommunist bent of the SS organization and its nationalistic, militaristic nature attracted the attention of the large magnates in the Ruhr, and they provided Hitler with the necessary funds for supporting and increasing the Nazi guard.³ Thus, during the trial of the industrialist Flick in Nuremberg, he admitted that each year he contributed more than 100,000 marks to the coffers of the SS. After the Nazis had taken power, in 2½ years just one concern I.G. Farben Industrie provided 20 million marks for the development of the SS organization as payment for the SS Command to send many thousands of concentration camp prisoners for work at the enterprises of this firm.⁴ With the financial support from German industrialists, by 1933, the SS organization already numbered 52,000 persons who were armed and formed into subunits and units. The tasks posed by the Nazi leadership for the SS came down to the "internal security of the Reich" and to combating the enemies of National Socialism, that is, those who did not support the Nazis and who did not share the misanthropic ideology, primarily against the communists.

The SS took over all the commanding posts in the police, justice, education, they were placed in such organizations as the "Hitler Youth," the Nazi "Worker Front" and so

forth. They covered the entire nation with an extensive network of informers who endeavored to discover all those who did not approve of the Nazi order. Using the SS detachments, the Nazis perpetrated monstrous reprisals against the communists and later the Social Democrats and trade union activists. In the nation, more than 1,000 prisons and concentration camps were set up and these were guarded by the SS subunits, including the Totenkopf [Death Head] Division.⁶ During the years that the Nazi Reich existed, the SS threw 7.8 million persons into prison or sent them off to camps, and a large portion of these were exterminated.⁷

In the course of the Great Patriotic War from the SS personnel special teams were recruited to destroy party, Komsomol and soviet activists on the temporarily occupied portion of Soviet territory. Millions of Soviet citizens became the victims of their arbitrary rule. Even in the prewar years, SS divisions were organized which were brought together under the overall name of the SS Troops. During the war years, these carried out primarily punitive functions in annihilating Soviet citizens and prisoners of war. The defeats which the Soviet Army dealt the Nazi troops forced the Nazi upper clique to use the SS Troops on the front, primarily for forcing their own troops to fight actively. But in spite of these obvious facts, the reactionary forces in the FRG have endeavored to show that the SS Troops were ordinary simple soldiers carrying out their duty.⁸

In anticipating the inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany, the leaders of the Nazi Party and the military industrial monopolies even prior to 1945 endeavored to do everything possible to save the SS personnel in the hope of utilizing them in the future for their criminal purposes.

On 10 September 1944, in Strasbourg, a meeting was held for the representatives of the state and party apparatus, the industrial concerns and the SS Command. Here they discussed the question of ensuring continuing actions by the rightist forces after the war.⁹ Soon thereafter two organizations were set up "Odessa" and "Spinme" (Spider) which were to spirit the former SS officers out of Germany into those nations where they could count on the protection of the authorities. The funds for organizing the flights were taken out of secret SS accounts and were received from banks in Switzerland and other neutral countries. These deposits had been made previously and comprised a portion of the capital which the SS had plundered in the prewar and war years.

The leaders of these organizations and their patrons carefully watched the postwar political development of Germany, particularly its Western Party. When, in 1949, the FRG was founded, they increased their activities and set the following tasks:

1. The infiltration of former Nazis into the organs of justice, the courts, the police, the local authorities and other organizations in order to protect one another against persecution for the crimes committed during the Nazi times. The use of all means for ensuring the successful legal defense of the Nazi and war criminals brought to court.
2. The joining of rightist political parties in the aim of influencing their policy and attitude toward Naziism and former SS members.
3. Penetration into commerce, industry, the mass information media and the utilizing of the achieved positions, particularly in the press bodies, for the public rehabilitation of the Nazis and the former SS servicemen as well as propagandizing the ideas of revenge and aggression.

4. Establishing the story that supposedly the anti-Soviet policy of Hitler and Goebbels propaganda do not run contrary to modern FRG policy and should be employed in the psychological warfare against socialism.

Even at the beginning of the 1950's, the former SS members began to set up their own legal unions in the FRG and in 1954 these were formed into the organization of "Mutual Aid Society for Former SS Soldiers" (HIAG).¹⁰ At present, this organization has around 300,000 members,¹¹ and publishes a magazine called DER FREIWILLIGE (Volunteer).

The structure of this organization is two-tiered. It is now called the "Federal Union for Soldiers of the Former SS Troops" (HIAG)¹² and has 118 local and regional divisions. It includes the unions of former SS members and the structure of these is organized according to membership in the former divisions, regiments, battalions and even companies of the SS.¹³

Since 1962, the HIAG has been a collective member of the "Union of German Soldiers" which brings together numerous soldier unions of former servicemen from units and formations of the German Army from the period of World War II and even World War I.¹⁴

The former SS members show great activity among the rightist forces in the FRG. Thus, in 1977, in the nation there were more than 140 major propaganda measures by the neo-Nazi groupings and unions and the associations of former SS members were responsible for more than 70 of them.¹⁵ The meetings of former SS members are attended by official representatives from such parties as the NDP, CDU/CSU and even from the right wing of the SDPD. Former SS generals and officers attend the Bundeswehr maneuvers, they visit barracks and speak to the servicemen about the last war during the open house days, when access to the military compounds is open to preinduction youth and local residents. This, in the opinion of the Bundeswehr Command should help "strengthen the combat spirit" and military traditions. Literature devoted to the actions of the SS Troops on the front is found in all the Bundeswehr libraries.

It must be pointed out that the former SS members hold prominent positions in the state, in particular in the legislative bodies. Thus, since 1977, G. Wiesebach has been a Bundestag deputy from the CDU. He was an SS member since 1937, he was a participant of punitive operations on the territory of the temporarily occupied USSR oblasts and was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment for the committed crimes.¹⁶

There have been mass runs of publications which glorify the SS members, falsify history and have an anti-Soviet focus. These include "Volunteers of the SS Troops" by F. Steiner, "The SS Troops in Action" by P. Hausser, "The History of the SS Troops" by G. Stein and others. Histories have even been published on the individual formations of the SS Troops, including a three-volume history of the SS Division Das Reich.¹⁷

In 1979, on the pages of the newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG, each Sunday for 6 months materials appeared from a series by an "anti-Soviet fighter" under the general title "Prisoners of War." These, in a distorted light, showed the life of the German prisoners of war in the USSR and contained flagrant slander of the Soviet people. The co-author of the entire series published as a separate book in 1980 was a certain Paul Karell. His true name is Karl Schmidt. He was a member of the SS from 1938.¹⁸ In the FRG, a series of records has been issued devoted to the history and deeds of the SS Troops,

and in particular they have recorded the marches of the SS as performed by the Bundeswehr band and there are the stories of the participants of the operation to kidnap the fascist dictator Mussolini from a camp of Italian partisans.¹⁹

In the FRG monuments have also been erected in honor of the former divisions of the SS Troops and here assemblies are held regularly for the former fighters of the Black Guard. Here, in the presence of representatives of the local authorities, Bundeswehr servicemen and youth from the rightist extremist organizations, speeches are given which are permeated with the poison of anticommunism and revanchism and wreaths are laid.²⁰

The HIAG is supported by the rightist forces. The role of these forces must not be underestimated. According to the data in the West German press which publishes the results of public opinion polls, it is known that 13 percent of the West German voters share extremely extremist convictions and 37 percent are supporters of an authoritarian regime.²¹

The HIAG is constantly broadening its ties with the overseas SS groups and has its liaison officers in 27 nations of the world. For example, in Brazil this role is filled by the former guard of the Nazi concentration camp, the SS member Gustav Wagner and in Switzerland it is Dr Heinz Mann. These links are headed by the former commander of the SS junkers school Toltz and the former Hitler aide, SS obersturmbannfuhrer Schultze-Kossens.²² Periodically, as a rule in Bavaria, meetings are held for the overseas HIAG representatives together with the general directors of the overseas firms set up using funds spirited out of Germany by the Nazis at the end of the war.²³

The HIAG cooperates energetically with the neo-Nazi organizations in the FRG and their number has recently increased up to 180; they have a membership of over 20,000 persons. The largest and most active of them was organized in 1975 as the "Fighting Union of German Soldiers." The aim of this union is "to fight for the resurrection of the German Reich within the conquered frontiers, the punishing of all participants in the anti-Nazi Resistance and action against the accusation of SS members of mass crimes."²⁴

The unions of former SS members are an important component part of the reactionary rightist forces and a real threat to the cause of peace and the security of peoples. This is why the activities of the SS unions has caused ever-greater resistance among the progressive public in the FRG and abroad. An enormous role in unmasking the dangerous actions of these organizations has been carried out by the German Communist Party and the Union of Socialist German Working Youth. The "Association of Persons Persecuted Under Naziism (APPN) and Antifascist Union" has acted consistently and purposefully against the SS unions. Through the weekly DIE TAT as well as by publishing special collections of documents showing the crimes of the SS during the years of the Nazi Reich and by holding numerous debate evenings and anti-Nazi demonstrations, this association endeavors to mobilize broad groups of the FRG population and other Western European countries to fight to ban the SS organizations.

Upon the initiative of the "Anti-Nazi Union" an international committee was organized for the disbanding of the SS unions and against the rehabilitation of Naziism.²⁵ It is becoming ever-clearer to the international progressive community that a serious danger in popularizing the criminal past of the former SS members consists primarily

in the fact that the FRG rightist circles are endeavoring to influence primarily modern West German youth, in endeavoring to turn them into an obedient tool of those influential military-industrial forces which once brought Hitler to power, started World War II and now in every possible way are impeding a lessening of international tension and dream about revenge.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess. Sbornik materialov" [The Nuremberg Trial. Collection of Materials], Vol 1, 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Gosyurizdat, 1954, pp 81-83.
2. [Not in text]
3. R. Schnabel, "Macht ohne Moral--eine Dokumentation über die SS," Frankfurt/Main, 1957, p 43.
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FAR EAST OPERATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 67-71

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col A. Samoylov: "The Rout of the White Guards and Interventionists in the Far East"]

[Text] The 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Far East from the interventionists and White Guards is a very important date in our history. It is directly linked to the formation of the USSR. The military victory over the enemy won on the eastern frontiers of our motherland made it possible to move on to peaceful socialist construction on the entire territory of the world's first worker-peasant state and establish in law the fraternal unity of the Soviet republics.

Those distant events have not become merely a matter of history. Many lessons of those times remain pertinent and instructive.

By the start of 1920, the Red Army had won a number of major victories, it had routed the main Kolchak forces and had reached Irkutsk. This success was ensured by the strengthening of the logistical base and by the ideological and political tempering of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] soldiers and commanders, by the going over of the basic mass of the population in Siberia and the Far East to the side of Soviet power, as well as by the disintegration and demoralization of the White Guard troops. On 7 March, the 5th Army entered Irkutsk. The remnants of the Kolchak formations fled into the Transbaykal area while the interventionists began to withdraw their troops from the Far East. The true reasons for this are indicated in a letter from Secretary of State Lansing to the U.S. President Wilson on 23 December 1919: "The Kolchak Government has already been defeated and the Bolshevik Army has advanced into Eastern Siberia.... The population evidently prefers them to the Kolchak officers. The Bolshevik Army is approaching the dispositions of our soldiers. If it comes into contact with our troops, this will lead to outright military operations and cause a mass of complications."¹

However, strong Japanese forces continued to remain in the Far East. The further advance by the Red Army could cause a war with Japan which, due to the complicated relations with White Poland and the danger to the South of Russia by Vrangeli, would be an unbearable burden for the young Soviet republic. "To wage war with Japan," said V.I. Lenin, "is beyond us and we should do everything to...avoid it, because war

for us is now beyond us for understandable reasons."² Upon the leader's instructions the offensive was halted.

Chita and Vladivostok remained the basic centers of counterrevolution. Ataman Semenov was the successor to Kolchak. Japan planned, relying on the local counterrevolution, to hold the Transbaykal and Far East under its control. Under these conditions, the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] were forced into a temporary measure of forming a special buffer state, the Far Eastern Republic (DVR). "A buffer is a buffer to gain time and then to hit the Japanese," felt V. I. Lenin.³ For actually providing leadership over the organization of the "buffer," on 3 March 1920, the Far Eastern Bureau of the RKP(b) was organized with a membership of N. K. Goncharov, A. M. Krasnoshchekov, A. A. Shiryamov, P. M. Nikiforov, S. G. Lazo and I. G. Kushnarev.

In April 1920, the Constituent Congress of the Baykal and Verkhneudinsk Workers proclaimed the creation of the DVR consisting of the Transbaykal, Amur, Maritime and Kamchatka Oblasts and Northern Sakhalin. A provisional government was organized, and the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the DVR was formed from the Soviet troops, partisan detachments and former Kolchak units which had come over to the side of the revolution. On 14 May 1920, the Soviet government officially recognized the DVR. By this time, Soviet power had been restored only in Amur Oblast which was a "Red island" and a base where the forces were being mobilized for the complete expulsion of the interventionists and White Guards.

The Dal'byuro [Far Eastern Bureau] directed the work of the DVR government, the trade unions, Komsomol organization and cooperative movement. Particular attention was given to the questions of the organizational development of the armed forces.

The Amur party obkom and the military commissariat in the summer of 1920 were able to organize a battleworthy army of 40,000 men.⁴ It consisted of representatives from different nationalities including Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Buryats and others. In the international division, two regiments were organized from Chinese and one from Koreans. There were units and subunits consisting of Poles and Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, Germans and Yugoslavs. The NRA from the very outset was organized as a multinational combat alliance of peoples. Its aims and tasks soon became familiar and understood by the indigenous population and small peoples of the North including the Nanays, Evenki, Chukchi, Tungus, Koryaks and others. On 16 February 1920, in the Amur area, delegates from 20 Gilyak camps at a meeting adopted a resolution: "...Against the uninvited strangers we will make armed resistance together with the peasants and partisan detachments. We will rise as one man, we will defend our lives, children and property until we have driven out the criminal Japanese from our land or have laid down everything in the struggle for our life and liberty."⁵ At that time, the main task for the revolutionary forces in the Far East was to eliminate the "Chita plug" (the White Guards of Ataman Semenov had settled in Chita and had cut off the Far East from Soviet Russia). In the Transbaykal area there were around 40,000 Semenov and Kappelev troops, not counting the Japanese units.⁶ In endeavoring to avoid a military clash, the DVR government endeavored by diplomacy to win Japanese neutrality in the forthcoming battles for Chita. The complex international situation, the successes of the Red Army on the Polish Front, the activities of the partisans and the dissatisfaction among the Japanese people with the extended war—all of this caused the Japanese command to come to the conference table with the talks being held at

Gongota Station. These started at the end of May and terminated on 15 July 1920 with the signing of a truce agreement on the Chita Front, the evacuating of the Japanese troops from the Transbaykal and the establishing of a neutral zone. This agreement tied the hands of the NRA and for this reason the operation to liberate Chita was carried out by the Transbaykal partisans and units of the Amur Partisan Army which were not tied by the Gongota Agreement.

On 15 October 1920, the units of the Amur Army and the partisans (around 10,000 bayonets, 20,000 sabers, 35 guns, 2 armored trains and 2 tanks) went over to the offensive.⁷ As a result of fierce battles, the Whites were retreated and fled into Manchuria, discarding their weapons and military supplies. On 23 October, the DVR government moved to Chita. The "Chita plug" had been eliminated and the route to Soviet Russia became clear.

However, the Japanese troops, in spite of the previously achieved agreement, did not evacuate and were moved to the Maritime Area where a new center for fighting the NRA was formed. In preparing for battle, the DVR government in every possible way strengthened the armed forces. The NRA was organized along the lines of the Red Army and encountered great difficulties. These included a shortage of weapons, supplies and food, a lack of command and political personnel, petty bourgeois ideas among a portion of the troops and the remnants of partisan activities. In combating these difficulties, an enormous role was played by the political bodies. According to a decision of Dal'byuro, in the NRA a Military-Political Directorate and political sections for the divisions, brigades and garrisons were created and the institution of military commissars and political leaders was introduced.⁸ The political workers as well as the communist cells united the NRA personnel and mobilized them to carry out the combat tasks. In the troops there was enormous affection for the military commissars P. P. Postyshev, V. A. Smirnov, I. M. Sibirtsev, I. S. Konev, A. A. Fadeyev and others. The party mobilizations carried out by Dal'byuro significantly strengthened the NRA. By the summer of 1922, on the eve of the crucial battles for the liberation of the Far East, in the NRA there were 13,849 members of the RKP(b), candidate members and Komsomol members.⁹ All these measures were a secure basis for the battleworthiness of the NRA and one of the main reasons for its military successes.

In May 1921, the Japanese interventionists in Vladivostok organized a counter-revolutionary coup and set up a pro-Japanese puppet government headed by the Markulov brothers. Upon the demand of its bosses, the government began preparations for armed actions against the DVR and organized a well-equipped army. At the end of November 1921, having pressed the Maritime partisan detachments up against the hills, the commander of the White Army, Gen Molchanov, directed the main forces against Khabarovsk. For repelling this offensive, the Eastern Front was reformed (commander, S. M. Seryshev, military commissar P. P. Postyshev).

The Politburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee undertook emergency measures to provide help to the DVR. By a decree of the Labor and Defense Council of 2 November 1921 signed by V. I. Lenin, the DVR government was given 2.3 million gold rubles and 1.5 million rubles was put at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the NRA, V. K. Blyukher.¹⁰ Trains carrying weapons and ammunition moved east, and experienced commanders and commissars were sent to the NRA. Nevertheless, at first its units were forced to retreat. This is explained by the fact that the offensive coincided with the reorganization of the NRA and the discharging of the older NRA soldiers.

In addition, the basic portion of the DVR armed forces was in the Transbaykal area. On 22 December 1921, the Whites entered Khabarovsk. However, the basic NRA forces succeeded in retreating to the left bank of the Amur and to dig in at In Station.

The Dal'byuro of the RKP(b) Central Committee, the DVR government and the NRA military council undertook enormous organizational activity to prepare for the defeat of the enemy. In the Amur and Maritime Oblasts, all men capable of bearing arms from the ages of 18 to 30 were mobilized. The military personnel called away previously for party and state work was returned to the army. The workers of the region provided active aid to the NRA. Everywhere there was the collecting of food and warm clothing. The DVR government organized a central committee for aiding the front and this included representatives from the trade unions, the NRA military-political directorate, the cooperative movement and the Chamber of Trade and Industry.¹¹

All these measures strengthened the revolutionary units and made it possible for the command of the Eastern Front to go over to decisive actions. The Volochayevka staging area was the basic strongpoint of the White Guards (4,500 bayonets and sabers, 12 guns, 63 machine guns and 3 armored trains). The approaches to Volochayevka were reinforced by rows of barbed wire, trenches and enormous ice ramparts. The forested areas to the south of Volochayevka as well as the Iyun-Koran Hill strengthened the enemy's defensive positions which stretched for 18 km.

The forces of the Eastern Front (around 7,600 bayonets and sabers, 30 guns, 300 machine guns and 3 armored trains) were organized into two operational groups: the In under the command of S. M. Seryshev and the Transbaykal headed by N. D. Tomin. Direct leadership over combat operations was provided by the war minister and commander-in-chief of the DVR Armed Forces, V. K. Blyukher. On 5 February, the Transbaykal troops were able to capture the important rail station of Olgokhta, to repel the strong enemy counterattacks and ensure conditions for the deployment of the In group for attacking Volochayevka.

At dawn of 10 February, in a terrible frost, the composite brigade of this group under the command of Ya. Z. Pokus made the basic strike at the center of the Volochayevka positions. At the same time, the Transbaykal group started an offensive against Verkhne-Spasskoye and Nizhne-Spasskoye with the task of cutting the Ussuri Railroad and encircling the White Guards in the region of Khabarovsk. However, on the first day the NRA troops were able to break through only the first line of fortifications at Volochayevka and were forced to dig in under heavy fire. On 12 February, at 0700 hours a new storming of Volochayevka commenced. The armored trains which had been brought up significantly reinforced the fire power and gladdened the NRA troops. The inspired zeal of the Red troops could not be checked. Not having clippers to cut the barbed wire, the men broke it with their gun butts and covered it with discarded clothing. An energetic offensive into the enemy rear was also commenced by the Transbaykal group. Unable to hold out against the bayonet attack, the White Guards fled. At 1100 hours a red banner was raised at the top of Iyun-Koran Hill. After the Civil War, Volochayevka became known as the "Far Eastern Perekop."

On 14 February 1922, the Whites were forced to abandon Khabarovsk. Only the intervention of the Japanese deferred their final defeat and made it possible for them to pull back into the Maritime Province. But even here they were unable to deal with the forces as the Maritime partisans carried out continuous attacks. The Military

Council of the DVR Eastern Front which was in Khabarovsk coordinated the combat operations of the partisans and NRA units. The commander of the Maritime partisan detachments (from April through October 1922) was the experienced military leader and communist M. P. Vol'skiy. Over the 10 months of 1922, according to the data of the chief of staff of the Maritime partisan detachments, B. K. Rubtsov, 22 troop trains and 2 armored trains were blown up. The Japanese in battles against the partisan detachments lost 1,300 men killed and 200 taken prisoner.¹² The partisans had the complete and unconditional support of the local population. Suffice it to say that the Maritime peasantry allocated 5 percent of the harvest to the partisans.

A Japanese infantry division and 5,000 White Guards were used to combat the partisans. However, the Japanese units were no longer the mighty combat force which they had been during the first years of the intervention. The process of disintegration and demoralization among the soldiers was in full swing. The severe losses in battles, the revolutionary agitation and propaganda conducted by the NRA political bodies and the partisans in the Japanese troops—all of this sharply reduced the battleworthiness of the interventionists. In Iman and Suchan there were instances of the voluntary presence by Japanese soldiers at meetings; at Pervaya Rechka Station three Japanese regiments revolted.¹³ In Japan itself, there was a wave of protests against intervention in Russia. Under the pressure of the working masses, the government resigned. A new cabinet of ministers formed by Adm Kato took a decision to withdraw the Japanese troops from the Maritime Area by 1 November 1922.

In the autumn of 1922, favorable conditions developed for eliminating the last bulwark of the White Guards in the Maritime Area. The liberation of Spassk was a major event. The NRA under the command of I. P. Uborevich stormed the Spassk fortifications. After this attack, the White units fled in panic.

On 25 October 1922, the NRA troops entered Vladivostok. V. I. Lenin in a telegram of greetings to the liberated Maritime Area wrote: "In welcoming this new victory for all the Russian workers and the heroic Red Army, I request that the DVR government extend greetings of the RSFSR SNK to all the workers and peasants of the liberated oblasts and the city of Vladivostok."¹⁴ The Civil War had ended on all the territory of the Soviet republic. A new page in our history had commenced, the period of peaceful socialist construction.

The Civil War in the Far East was waged under the leadership of the Communist Party. Suffice it to point out that in 1920-1922, the Central Committee adopted around 60 resolutions directly relating to the work of Dal'byuro. The Far Eastern organizations of the RKP(b) rallied around themselves the masses of workers, they determined the forms and tasks of the revolutionary movement, they worked out the tactics of the struggle, they unmasked the bourgeois parties and isolated them from the masses and organized the partisan movement.

The creation of the DVR was an example of the state wisdom of V. I. Lenin and the ability of the Communist Party to find the solely correct solution in the most complicated conditions. The formation of the buffer state was a far-sighted political compromise. It made it possible for the young Soviet republic to avoid an outright military clash with Japan, to successively rout all the enemies in the South and West of the nation and then with the aid of the NRA and the partisans to liberate the entire Far East, to restore Soviet power there and reunite the region with the RSFSR.

The struggle of the Russian people for the liberation of the Far East had a truly international character. In the NRA were units and formations of Poles and Hungarians, Chinese and Koreans, Czechs and Slovaks, Germans and Yugoslavs. The internationalists were fighting not only for the liberation of the Far East, but were also fighting their own enemy, international imperialism. V. I. Lenin said that the struggle and history of the Red Army victories "will be of gigantic, world significance for all the peoples of the East...and the liberation of the peoples of the East is now completely feasible not only from the viewpoint of the prospects of the international revolution, but also from the viewpoint of direct military experience carried out in Asia and Siberia, the experience which the Soviet republic has had subjected to military invasion by all the powerful nations of imperialism."¹⁵

For this reason the victory over the interventionists and White Guards in the Far East was of enormous international significance. It contributed to the rise of the national liberation movement in Asia, primarily in China, Korea and Mongolia. Many internationalists who gained political and military experience in the crucible of battles for the liberation of the Far East employed it in the struggle in their own countries.

Present-day anticommunists have endeavored to conceal the true role of the intervention in starting the Civil War in Russia. In carrying out the class command of the bourgeoisie, the modern "defenders of democracy" want to conceal from the peoples the truth of the bestial nature of imperialism. Historical truth has concluded that without the foreign military intervention the Civil War would not have been so extended and bloody. The United States was the organizer and active participant in the intervention. Japanese troops carried out the role of the basic strike force in the Far East. The intervention represented an united front of imperialism.

The interventionists were marked by extreme cruelty. They threw more than 80,000 persons into the prisons and concentration camps of Siberia and the Far East and at least 40,000 of these were executed. In the Far East, around 80,000 persons were killed in battle, died from wounds or tortured by the interventionists and White Guards.¹⁶ It has been confirmed by documents that the losses from the interventionists and White Guards in the Far East amounted to more than 603 million rubles in gold.¹⁷

Some 60 years now separate us from the historic events in the Far East. But the feat of the people and the army has not diminished over time. "The heroism and self-sacrifice of the soldiers of the revolution," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "their readiness for self-sacrifice and to endure any hardships for the sake of victory at present inspires the world. Perekop, Kakhovka and Volochayevka, the Chapayev heroes and the cavalry heroes are extolled in song. Their feat is the example which all the new generations of Soviet people will follow. The traditions of the unstinting struggle for the socialist motherland which arose during the years of the Civil War will always remain for us, the heirs of October, an inexhaustible source of courage and steadfastness and will to victory."¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

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AIRBORNE TROOPS: COMBAT EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT FROM 1929 TO 1941

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col N. Ramanichev: "Development of the Theory and Practice in the Combat Employment of Airborne Troops in the Interwar Period"]

[Text] The organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces during the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars was carried out by the Communist Party in accord with the scientific prediction of the nature and particular features of a future war. Proceeding from this, the military organizational development plans envisaged a harmonious combination of all the branches of troops, including the Airborne Troops (VDV). The VDV trace their history back to 1929, when for the first time aircraft (by the landing method) were used to land an armed detachment of Red Army men in the town of Garm which was besieged by the Basmach bands and with the support of the local inhabitants this detachment routed the large Basmach band which had invaded Tajikistan territory.

The theory of an offensive operation in depth worked out by Soviet military science in the 1930's and envisaging the use of airborne troops also served as a powerful impetus for the further development of the new branch of troops. The essence of this theory consisted "in the simultaneous neutralizing of enemy defenses by weapons to the entire depth, in breaking through its tactical zone on a selected sector with the subsequent rapid development of the tactical success into an operational one by committing to battle the echelon for developing the success (tanks, motorized infantry and cavalry) and landing airborne troops for rapidly achieving the set goal."¹

Even at the end of the 1920's and the start of the 1930's, the attention of many Soviet military theoreticians and line officers in the area of the combat employment of paratroopers was attracted to such problems as clearly defining the nature and scope of the tasks which they should carry out in an engagement and an operation, the landing methods and tactics of operations in the enemy rear. Thus, in the middle of 1928, upon the initiative and under the leadership of M. N. Tukhachevskiy, an abstract was worked out on the subject "Operations of an Airborne Assault Force in an Offensive Operation" and later a military game was conducted with the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District.² In the following year, here was held an exercise using an air-landed assault force numbering a little more than a reinforced rifle company. In the report on the troop maneuvers conducted in 1929-1930 in the Leningrad Military

District, M. N. Tukhachevskiy again returned to the given question. This time he proposed for review by the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] sample TOE and a structure of an air-motorized division to be used as an operational-strategic landing force.³

At that time the military journals published articles by the chief of staff of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Force A. N. Lapchinskiy⁴ and one of the high officials of this staff N. P. Ivanov⁵ on the question of airborne assault forces. These articles posed and partially resolved such important problems as the operational-tactical purpose of airborne forces, the choice of the moment, conditions and procedure for their landing, cooperation between aviation and ground forces, and example calculations were given for the men and equipment as well as the landing times for the air-landed assault force from a battalion to a company in strength.

The questions raised by M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. N. Lapchinskiy, N. P. Ivanov and other military leaders and specialists on the combat employment of airborne landing forces were developed in military theoretical works, in exercises and maneuvers as well as in instructions, manuals and regulations.

After the first Soviet parachute enterprise began production in April 1930, exercises commenced on the mastering of jumps from a plane. On 2 August in the Moscow Military District for the first time 12 paratroopers were landed to carry out diversionary actions in the rear of a hypothetical enemy. Later, in September, a group of 12 paratroopers after landing made a training raid on a divisional staff.⁶ Thus, in 1930, the first experience had been gained in the employment of a paratrooper force and this showed the prospects for the new means of armed combat. For this reason, in the order of the USSR RVS on the results of combat training in the 1929-1930 training year, the RKKA Staff was instructed during the new training year to thoroughly study paratrooper operations from the technical aspect in the aim of working out and issuing the appropriate instructions to the troops.⁷ From this moment to the start of the Great Patriotic War, the questions of the training and actions of airborne assault forces were reflected in all the orders on the combat training of the RKKA and from 1933, in the manuals and regulations.

In March 1931, in the Leningrad Military District, a volunteer experimental airborne detachment was set up⁸ and in the autumn its subunits participated in combined (paratrooper-air landed) landings during maneuvers in the Leningrad and Ukrainian Military Districts.⁹

On 5 January 1932, the USSR RVS adopted a decision to organize four air motor detachments in the Moscow, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Volga Military Districts.¹⁰ In February 1932, the draft "Regulation on the Operational-Tactical Employment of Air Motor Landing Detachments" was issued as well as a list of subjects for their tactical training in the 1932-1933 training year.¹¹ According to this document, the air motor detachments were considered an army means of operational-tactical significance. Their tasks were closely linked to the operations of the ground troops.

In the course of mobilization, they could be employed for blowing up large railway bridges, ammunition and fuel dumps and for destroying aircraft on the enemy forward airfields. In an offensive, the air motor detachments were to be used for destroying the lines of communications, for disrupting supplies, for defeating the enemy staffs

and important troop supply installations, for creating obstacles for the retreat of enemy troops and the bringing up of reserves from the interior by building obstacles, capturing and holding narrows, defiles and passes as well as by attacking individual columns. On the defensive, the detachments were designed to prevent the bringing up of reserves, to disrupt control, to upset the activities of the rear services in the most important sectors and during the crucial periods of combat and an operation as well as for seizing airfields and carrying out other tasks.

In April 1932, the "Regulation Governing the Special Design Bureau of the RKKA Air Forces" was approved.¹² This OKB [special design bureau] was to be used for designing and building airborne equipment. In the same year, it began designing gliders, parachute platforms and parachutes for 76-mm guns, motor vehicles, motorcycles and tankettes.¹³ It also designed suspended cabins for the TB-1 aircraft (bomber) for transporting paratroopers. In November 1932, the basic demands for the weapons system of the airborne landing detachments were worked out and submitted to the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense].¹⁴ Due to the absence of a special air transport designed to carry cargo, equipment and the paratroopers themselves, the TB-1 and TB-3 bombers were reequipped for his purpose. The latter could carry up to 32 assault troops with their parachutes and up to 50 without parachutes.¹⁵

At the same time, theoretical elucidation of the principles for the combat employment of air assault forces was continued. In 1932, in his work "Novyye voprosy voyny" [New Questions of Warfare], N. M. Tukhachevskiy concretized the role and tasks of the airborne assault forces in an operation and combat. In his opinion, the assault forces should operate between the positions of the corps, army and front enemy reserves, thereby restricting their actions in the entire depth of operational defenses.¹⁶ Thus, there were plans to employ both operational and tactical airborne assault forces.

Interesting proposals were voiced by the Chief of the Airborne Service of the Air Forces Staff, I. Ye. Tatarchenko, in an article entitled "Technical, Organizational and Operational Questions of Airborne Assault Forces" published in the journal VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA.¹⁷ In it the author developed the idea of creating independent airborne troops equipped with special equipment and weapons and he investigated in detail the questions of the combat support for the assault forces, feeling that a dependable cover for the loading airfields against air strikes and then the ferrying of the troops itself should be supported by the prompt detection of enemy aircraft by our reconnaissance aviation, by a fighter cover for the assault forces and by the camouflaging of loading work. The ground attack and bomber aviation should attack enemy airfields both during the flight of the assault force as well as during its landing (dropping) and in addition cooperate with it in the landing area and during operations in the enemy rear.

In the aim of shortening the drop (landing) time, the author considered it advisable to make the landing simultaneously in several areas. First, the groups should be dropped for capturing and preparing the drop (landing) areas, and after them the vanguard (this could be landed by any method). The landing of the main forces should start after the capture groups and vanguard had captured a sufficient number of areas or airfields and secured the landing area against strikes by significant enemy forces.

The growing need to employ airborne assault forces in the interests of a division, corps and army fighting on the sector of the main thrust required the creation of air landing

battalions under the rifle corps and regular divisions (Decree of the USSR RVS of 11 December 1932). In line with this, the military districts began organizing 25 volunteer special-purpose (air landing) separate rifle battalions.¹⁸ In the aim of further developing the air landing troops and training the appropriate personnel, the air motor landing detachment of the Leningrad Military District in 1933 was transformed into the special-purpose air brigade.¹⁹

In March 1933, a combat training course was worked out which envisaged the mastery of landing by the air-landed, parachute and combined methods.²⁰ The basic task in the combat training of the airborne forces, as was pointed out in the course, is the working out of actions after the landing, that is: assembly, movement to the objective (raid) and the carrying out of standard, operational-tactical tasks in the enemy rear.

On 15 June 1933, the Deputy Chief of the RKKA Staff S. A. Mazheninov sent out to the districts the "Provisional Instructions on the Combat Employment of Air Landing Units"²¹ worked out under his leadership. This encompassed a broader range of questions than the draft "Regulations on the Operational-Tactical Employment of Air Motor Landing Detachments." The instructions divided the assault forces into operational and tactical. An operational assault force consisting of a regiment or brigade was to be used in the operational zone, deep in the enemy rear, while the tactical one was to be employed in the tactical defensive zone. The latter could consist of one or several battalions (companies).

The instructions worked out in rather extensive detail the questions of organizing a landing operation. For example, they stated that before taking a decision to use the air landing forces, the combined-arms staff together with the chief of the air group or the commander of the assault force should study the enemy in detail using the available materials and maps and should conduct additional air reconnaissance in the aim of determining the possible places for the location of reserves, staffs, airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, rear defensive lines, supply routes, convenient areas for the landing, the obtaining of information on the socioclass composition of the inhabitants in the area of the forthcoming operations of the landing force. The area was to be photographed and then a detailed plan of the landing worked out.

The organization of cooperation between aviation and the landing units was entrusted to the senior chief assigned to direct the airborne landing operation. The commanders of the troop units and formations where the landing force was to operate in the sector of advance were to take the necessary measures for linking up with them. It was also established that the landing force from the moment of loading into the aircraft until the landing was to be under the air chief.

The instructions demanded that the operations of the assault troops have an offensive, fluid and daringly bold nature. The strikes should be made by surprise, quickly and with concentrated forces. It was felt that the principle of massing the men and equipment was of crucial significance. A maximum demonstration of initiative, boldness and tenacity was demanded from the commanders and airborne troops.

By the end of 1933, the Red Army possessed 1 airborne brigade, 4 air motor detachments, 29 separate battalions and several companies and platoons with a total of around 10,000 men.²² The TB-1 and TB-3 bombers had been employed for landing them and production of personnel and cargo parachutes had been organized. The paratroopers were trained in group jumps with weapons during the day and at night, during the winter and summer, and over varying terrain.

The command of the Red Army and the military districts obtained a broad opportunity in the course of the large operational-strategic exercises to check out the ideas in the theory about an operation in depth and deep combat. Thus, during the maneuvers in the Belorussian Military District (1934), there was a dropping of operational and tactical landing forces. The tactical force consisting of 129 men was dropped on 7 September with the task of capturing the prevailing heights along the road between Bobruysk and Minsk, the crossings on the Svisloch River and in cooperation with a motorized regiment to check the retreat of the "enemy," ensuring its encirclement.²³ The operational force numbering 603 men was dropped on 9 September in an area to the northeast of Minsk in order, in cooperation with a mechanized brigade, to surround the "enemy" in the area of Trostyanets and by cutting the Smolevichi--Minsk road, to deprive it of the possibility of bringing up reserves.²⁴

In September 1935, during maneuvers in the Kiev Military District,²⁵ a combined assault force was employed consisting of two paratrooper regiments (1,188 men) and two rifle regiments of an air-landed force (1,765 men) linked by the headquarters of the rifle division.²⁶ The designated units received the mission of landing in the region of Brovary (to the northwest of Kiev), to check the bringing up of reserves from the east, to capture the crossings over the Dnepr in the area of Kiev and to assist the cavalry and rifle corps advancing from the west in taking the city (Diagram 1).²⁷




Diagram 1. Operations of Airborne Assault Force in Maneuvers of Kiev Military District on 14 September 1935

Key: 1--Paramilitary fighting detachment; 2--Brigade parachute regiment; 3--Composite parachute regiment; 4--Main forces of air landing group; 5--Direction of operations by capture group; 6--Defensive lines of capture group; 7--Axis of thrust by main forces of air landing group; 8--Location of destruction on roads.

In the same year, a larger combined assault force was landed in the Belorussian Military District and the largest in Moscow (1936).

The conducted maneuvers and exercises made it possible to complete the elaboration of a theory of an operation in depth and deep combat. In 1935, the instructions were improved on deep combat and in 1936, a Provisional Field Manual was adopted and draft regulations were worked out for conducting operations. Thus, the period from 1928 through 1936 can be described as a period for the development of the theory of combat employment for airborne assault forces, the organizing of the airborne troops and the acquiring of the first, although limited experience in their employment in exercises.

Over this period, the Soviet military command developed clear ideas on the role and tasks of the airborne assault forces and in the course of an operation in depth, these were to be employed in the sector of the main thrust, on a massed basis and with surprise, in close cooperation with the aviation, the cavalry and motor mechanized troops operating deep in the enemy defenses. Diagram 2 shows one of the variations of such operations.




Diagram 2. The Use of Airborne Assault Forces in Combat and an Operation (Variation)

Key: 1—Line of army group; 2—Line of army reserve; 3—Tactical zone, first zone, second zone; 4—Line of committing breakthrough echelon; 5—Echelon for developing breakthrough; 6—Army aviation; 7—Tactical landing force; 8—Operational landing force; 9—Enemy position; 10—Position of own troops.

Yet, as the experience of those times and the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense on combat training for the 1936-1937 training year indicate, very many questions of an airborne operation still required further elaboration. For example, the tactics of operations in the enemy rear were not sufficiently worked out and in particular combat in an encirclement and breaking out of it and partisan operations. The People's Commissar of Defense also posed the question of working out the landing of troops to a depth of 200 km and more. All these questions were reflected in the

new "Kurs podgotovki parashyutno-desantnykh voysk" [Course for the Training of Paratrooper Forces] adopted in 1937.

Work in following years was carried out in the same direction. With the start of World War II (1939), this was intensified, particularly in the area of the further development of the VDV. In 1940, substantial changes were made in the organization of an airborne brigade and in 1941 five airborne corps began to be organized.²⁸

Thus, by the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army possessed an advanced theory on the combat employment of airborne assault forces and this had been tested out in operational-tactical exercises. Soviet military thought was undoubtedly the first in working out this theory and in creating the VDV which were the largest for those times. The weak points in their employment were the lack of air transports as well as the absence of a special aircraft for carrying airborne assault troops. In addition, more advanced devices were needed for the landing of military equipment and weapons.

Many basic provisions in the theory and practice of the combat employment of the VDV as worked out in the Soviet Armed Forces in the interwar period, and particularly in the 1930's, have not lost their significance for the present.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 574.
2. I. I. Lisov, "Desantniki" [Assault Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, p 3.
3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33988, inv. 2, file 699.
4. A. N. Lapchinskiy, "Airborne Assault Forces," VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 6, 1930.
5. N. P. Ivanov, "An Airborne Assault Force," VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 23, 1930.
6. TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 50, file 177, sheet 34.
7. Ibid., file 109, sheet 19; file 169, sheet 3.
8. Ibid., file 86, sheets 1-2.
9. Ibid., inv. 35, file 10, sheet 170.
10. Ibid., inv. 54, file 13, sheet 1.
11. Ibid., sheets 6-11.
12. Ibid., inv. 76, file 203, sheet 3.
13. Ibid., inv. 54, file 33, sheet 58.

14. Ibid., inv. 76, file 203, sheet 44.
15. Ibid., file 239, sheets 204, 206.
16. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Novyye voprosy voyny" [New Questions of Warfare], Voenizdat, 1965, p 122.
17. VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA, Nos 5-6, 1932.
18. TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 76, file 239, sheets 8, 12.
19. Ibid., file 203, sheet 40; inv. 54, file 69, sheet 4. A brigade consisted of paratrooper and motorized-mechanized detachments, an artillery battalion and a flight group. It also trained a squad of glider flyers.
20. Ibid., inv. 76, file 240, sheet 2.
21. Ibid., file 240, sheets 285-293.
22. Ibid., file 241, sheet 519.
23. Ibid., file 114, sheet 65.
24. Ibid., sheet 70.
25. By the order of the USSR NKO of 17 May 1935, the Kiev and Kharkov Military Districts were formed on the basis of the Ukrainian Military District.
26. TsGASA, folio 25880, inv. 4, file 46, sheet 30. The paratrooper regiments were formed from the landing troops of an airborne brigade and airborne battalions.
27. Ibid., sheet 25.
28. In the capitalist nations, airborne troops began to be organized on the eve and during the first years of World War II, and the views on their role and combat employment in a majority of nations were not marked by profound thoroughness and consistency (for example, in France). The VDV were most developed in Nazi Germany, the United States and Great Britain. In the German Army, by the start of World War II, the VDV were based on paratrooper divisions as well as conventional infantry (mountain infantry) divisions which had been trained for landing. These participated in the capture of Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands (1940) and the island of Crete (1941).

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON THE RSFSR'S WARTIME CONTRIBUTIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 78-79

[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen S. Baranov of the book "RSFSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" (The RSFSR During the Years of the Great Patriotic War) by A. D. Kolesnik, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 328 pages]

[Text] Recently published under this title [the reviewed work] was the monograph by A. D. Kolesnik which brings out the problems of the rear services and the nation-wide aid to the front. Soviet historiography has received a fundamental work on the contribution of the RSFSR to the overall victory of the USSR in the last war. It starts by describing the basic areas for developing the national economy and certain particular features in the sociopolitical life of the republic during the prewar years. On the basis of an analysis of concrete historical facts and official materials, the author rightly concludes that Soviet Russia on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was not only the basic economic foundation for the nation, but also the main support for its military-economic potential.

Of great interest are the monograph's sections which disclose the complex process of reorganizing the economy and the work of the central apparatus of the Soviet bodies of the republic (the RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the RSFSR People's Commissariats and Departments) to a wartime footing. Here A. D. Kolesnik has made new materials available. We should note the data on the shifting of the republic's productive forces from the frontline and threatened areas deep into the rear of the nation. It is important that the author has succeeded in disclosing new evacuation routes and quantitative amounts for the evacuation of the population as well as data on its placement on the RSFSR territory as a whole and for the individual regions. The work also contains specific data on the evacuation of the population to the eastern regions of the RSFSR from the other temporarily enemy-occupied Union republics.

In the work, a proper place has been given to the problem of finding employment for the evacuated population. "According to incomplete data, by the start of February 1943, in the rear areas of the RSFSR there were 2,006,700 evacuated persons of working age including 1,946,700 persons with jobs" (p 99). In giving concrete data that three-quarters of the job-placed evacuated population was employed in the basic spheres of material production, the author concludes that this population was an important source for filling out the labor resources in the rear areas of the RSFSR.

Of significant interest are the data on the specific contribution of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia of Soviet Russia to the cause of completely defeating the Nazi occupiers. A special chapter is devoted to this. It gives examples of the labor heroism of the RSFSR workers who demonstrated the highest examples of Soviet patriotism and provided enormous help to the Red Army units and formations.

It should be emphasized that in showing the labor accomplishments of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia of the republic, the author brings out the appearance of each of these social categories and analyzes their socioeconomic and sociopolitical activities over the period of the armed struggle. He gives specific data on the size of the working class, the sources for replenishing its ranks, the forms and methods for training the personnel in various stages of the war. The struggle of the RSFSR kolkhoz peasantry for grain is examined with sufficient completeness as well as the basic areas for the labor activity of the republic's intelligentsia.

In the monograph, an important place has been given to the involved problem of the aid provided by all the workers of Russia to the front, starting from the militia movement and the national struggle in the enemy rear to financial and material support.

Indicative in this regard is the analysis of the question concerning the militia formations the size of which in the RSFSR exceeded 1.7 million persons (p 173). Of interest is the table on the receipt of money from the public for military equipment and weapons for the Red Army. Certainly, money was received from the workers of all the Union republics. But a mere comparison of the figures found in the table makes it possible for the reader to conclude that the largest share of money and materiel was received from the RSFSR workers.

Of significant interest is the concluding chapter of the monograph which examines the problem of the reconstruction of the national economy in the liberated and frontline regions of the RSFSR. It contains material on the socioeconomic consequences of the temporary Nazi occupation of the RSFSR regions and on the results of the rebuilding of the liberated and frontline regions of the republic. The book describes the mutual aid from the Union republics in the process of rebuilding the devastated areas. This is a concrete expression of the triumph of friendship among the Soviet peoples. This is particularly timely in line with the preparations for celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the monograph has been written on a high ideological-theoretical level and is not only of scientific-cognitive, but also practical significance, particularly for propagandists and agitators, party and Komsomol workers in production and in agriculture as well as in the Army and Navy formations. But this good publication would have been even more valuable if the essential references to archival and literary sources would have been put by the author in footnotes and not placed at the end of the book which undoubtedly impedes the reader's use of it.

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ITEMS FROM THE EDITOR'S MAILBAG

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 80-82

[Unattributed article: "You Ask—We Answer"]

[Excerpts] [Question] I have heard, writes S. M. Khimich (Kiev), that in the course of the American War of Independence, Russia provided help to the Americans in their struggle against the English colonialists and that Russian naval vessels were dispatched to the American shores and these participated in combat operations on the American side. Is this the case? Would you please provide more information, he asks, when this occurred and who commanded the Russian ships.

[Answer] During the American War of Independence (1775-1783), the Russian government did not send naval vessels to the American shores. However, the Russian Fleet participated in other events related to this war.

The fleets of the belligerents (the United States and England and later France and Spain which came in on the American side in 1778) during this period more and more frequently began to seize the merchant vessels of neutral states and prevent free trade under the pretext of capturing military contraband. The English Navy was particularly guilty of this.

In order to stop the arbitrariness of the English authorities on the international sea routes, the Russian government on 28 February 1780 came forward with a Declaration on the Freedom of Maritime Trade and Naval Armed Neutrality (for more detail see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1981, pp 93-94). It proclaimed the idea of protecting the trade of neutral countries against the violent actions of the English Navy. A number of other European nations and then France and Spain soon thereafter joined in the declaration.

In accord with the principles announced in the declaration, the Russian Naval Department in the spring of 1780 formed three squadrons from the Baltic Fleet to protect the international sea routes. The first squadron (commander, Rear Adm I. A. Borisov) was dispatched on 11 June 1780 to the Mediterranean, the second (Rear Adm A. I. Kruz) to the North Sea and the third (Capt Brig. Rank Palibin) to the shores of Portugal. Each squadron consisted of five ships of the line and one or two frigates.

Later, a detachment of two ships of the line and two transports left from Arkhangelsk to Nord Kapp (the Norwegian Sea).

The Russian cruiser detachments actually operated on the trade routes around Western Europe from Nord Kapp to the Mediterranean. They were not sent to the American shores.

[Question] The Soviet Military Encyclopedia, write V. M. Kamynin (Krivoy Rog), V. P. Smirnov (Sukhobezvodnoye in Gorkiy Oblast) and others in the article "The Soviet Guards" (Voyenizdat, 1966, Vol 2, pp 496-498), asserts that the Soviet Army had 117 guards rifle divisions and 9 guards airborne divisions. However, in the press, V. M. Kamynin states, mention is encountered of the 121st Guards Rifle Division and the 16th Guards Airborne Division. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives somewhat different figures. What is the answer to this?

[Answer] The Soviet Military Encyclopedia in the article "The Soviet Guards" correctly gives the number of guards rifle and airborne divisions.

At the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had 117 guards rifle divisions, although, as you correctly point out, there was also a 121st Guards Rifle Division. The problem was that initially the numbers were assigned strictly in order (up to the number 110) and then they departed from this rule. The 129th Guards Rifle Division received the highest number.

As for the guards airborne divisions, during the years of the Great Patriotic War there was a total of 16 of them, but by the end of the war only 9 remained, since the 8th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Guards Airborne Divisions were reorganized or renamed in 1943-1945 as guards rifle divisions.

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KOMSOMOL SPONSORSHIP OF THE SOVIET NAVY DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 87-89

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Adm (Ret) S. Zakharov: "Komsomol Sponsorship of the Navy"]

[Text] On 16 October 1922, the Fifth All-Russian Komsomol Congress upon the recommendation of V. I. Lenin, adopted a resolution to sponsor the Navy. The congress decision was announced in an order of Republic RVS [Revolutionary Military Council]. This stated: "In agreement with the decree of the Fifth All-Russian Komsomol Congress, from 16 October 1922 the Komsomol is to establish sponsorship of the Worker-Peasant Red Navy."¹

This event was an act of great political significance and a manifestation of the Communist Party's concern for the further development of the Soviet naval forces. Komsomol sponsorship strengthened the combat friendship of the Soviet youth with the sailors and marked a beginning to a new stage in its fruitful activity in organizing aid to the Navy.

Even in the first year, the Komsomol Central Committee conducted three Komsomol inductions as a result of which the naval ships and units, not counting the training schools, received around 8,000 men.² In steadfastly enduring hardships, they studied and worked enthusiastically and repaired and rebuilt the ships, recommissioning them one after another.

With the growth of the fleet, its need for command personnel also increased. In being guided by Lenin's instructions that "in building a new army, we should take the commanders only from the people,"³ the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee commanded that the Komsomol provide the naval schools with recruits chiefly from Komsomol members and the workers. In steadily carrying out the class manning principle, the Komsomol organizations sent the progressive part of the Soviet youth to the naval schools.

Many communists and Komsomol members who arrived in the Navy and naval schools in 1922-1925 subsequently became admirals and prominent naval leaders. During the Great Patriotic War, many of them commanded formations, naval bases and flotillas while Adms A. G. Golovko and V. F. Tributs commanded fleets.

The successful carrying out of our party's course of industrializing the nation created the conditions for the technical rearming of the Red Army and Navy. During the years of the prewar five-year plans, the Soviet shipyards began building new naval vessels of various classes equipped with domestically-produced military equipment and weapons. During this period, the Komsomol organizations carried out great work to mobilize the youth to build new fighting ships and to train them for naval service. At the enterprises, institutions, schools and at the induction centers, circles and clubs were organized and here the men acquired naval knowledge. The Komsomol members organized Saturday and Sunday workdays as well as performances and concerts. The money collected from these went for ship construction.

On 30 July 1931, on the Neva in Leningrad the torpedo boat "Pioner" was solemnly turned over to the Black Sea sailors. This boat was built from money collected by the Pioneers. In 1934, there was the submarine "Komsomolets" (a gift of the youth).

In 1939, upon instructions of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, 32 oblast and city Komsomol organizations sent off 20,000 of their members to the Navy. A large portion of them was assigned to detachments for learning naval specialties and the remainder were sent to training facilities.⁴

The friendship of the Lenin Komsomol and the Navy grew even stronger during the Great Patriotic War. The Komsomol organizations constantly maintained and strengthened the ties with the sailors and provided them with every possible aid. When the patriotic movement developed in our nation to collect money for military equipment for the Soviet Army and Navy, the Komsomol members and all the youth took a most active part in this. With the money collected by them, 150 fighting ships, many aircraft and other military equipment were built. Among them were the submarines "Leninskiy Komsomol," "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets," "Novosibirskiy Komsomolets," and "Chelyabinskiy Komsomolets" and the torpedo boats "Komsomolets Altaya," "Chkalovskiy Komsomolets" and "Barnaul'skiy Komsomolets."

On the ships, commemorative plaques were put up showing when they were built and with what funds. During the war years, Komsomol sponsorship of the Navy was enriched with new traditions and forms of ties. The following became widespread: the exchanging of delegations between the fleets, ships and sponsoring Komsomol organizations, the ceremonies escorting inductees off to service and the presentation to them of orders to add to the fighting glory of the Navy; the holding of joint special subject evenings; the exchange of letters which told how the Komsomol members were working in the rear and how their fellow countrymen were fighting against the Nazi invaders.

The Komsomol members successfully attacked the enemy. This can be seen from the motherland's decorations. Some 75,000 Komsomol sailors were awarded orders and medals. Over 400 members of the Lenin Komsomol who fought in the Navy's ranks became Heroes of the Soviet Union.⁶

Today, just as 60 years ago, Komsomol sponsorship of the Navy is continuing. For many years, for example, close ties of friendship have linked the Komsomol members of Moscow and Moscow Oblast with the Northern Fleet sailors, the Ukraine with the Black Sea Fleet, Belorussia with the Baltic Fleet, the Komsomol members of Siberia and the Far East work closely with the Pacific Fleet, while the Azerbaijani Komsomol members are tied to the Caspian Fleet. Some 54 ships and the Higher Naval Diving

School bear the name of the Lenin Komsomol as well as sponsoring republic, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations. An absolute majority of the name ships are outstanding and their crews serve as an example for all sailors.

The challenge Red Banners and the commemorative pennants of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol central committees of the Union republics, the kraykoms and obkoms are an effective means for mobilizing the Komsomol members and the youth to worthily carry out their military duty. These have been awarded to many of the best Komsomol organizations of the ships and units. Hundreds of outstanding men in training, masters of shooting and diving, highly skilled naval pilots, navigators and technicians have been awarded honorary certificates of the Komsomol Central Committee as well as other Komsomol decorations.

This year, the challenge Red Banners of the Komsomol Central Committee for fruitful work in the area of communist indoctrination of the youth and for high indicators in military and political training were awarded to the Komsomol organizations of the cruiser "Kiev" (Red Banner Northern Fleet, Komsomol secretary Lt V. I. Nesterov), the large ASW ship "Tashkent" (Red Banner Pacific Fleet, Komsomol committee secretary Lt N. A. Tsyganov). An award has been received for the second time by the Komsomol organization of the air regiment of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet and a third time awards have been received by the Komsomol organization of the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze.

For almost 15 years now, the crew of the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets" has received outstanding results in military and political training. For 2 years, this crew has been the initiator of the socialist competition in the Baltic Fleet and the Komsomol organization three times running has received the challenge Red Banner of the Komsomol Central Committee "Best Komsomol Organization with a Komsomol Name."

The Navy Komsomol organizations have fulfilled and are fulfilling successfully the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 19th Komsomol Congress and the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Among these are the crews of the submarines "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets," "Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets," "Magnitogorskiy Komsomolets," the large landing ships "Tomskiy Komsomolets" and "Krymskiy Komsomolets"; the patrol vessels "Primorskiy Komsomolets" and "Arkhangel'skiy Komsomolets"; the missile launchers "Tambovskiy Komsomolets," "Kirovskiy Komsomolets," "Komsomolets Tatarii" and "Kronshtadtskiy Komsomolets"; the coastal minesweepers "Orenburgskiy Komsomolets" and "Kolomenskiy Komsomolets" and other ships.

All the Soviet youth and all the men of the Army and Navy have accepted as a militant program of actions the farsighted words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, voiced by him at the 19th Komsomol Congress: "...The youth should constantly study. And they should not only master knowledge. They should learn honest labor, the ability to see life with all its complexities from the standpoint of Soviet patriotism and communist conviction. They should learn implacability for even the slightest deviations from our social standards. They should be schooled in army service and learn to master the modern weapons and military equipment in order to always be ready to defend the motherland."⁷

At present, when all the Soviet people are working with inspiration to carry out the grandiose tasks posed by the 26th CPSU Congress and the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the Navy Komsomol members, like all our youth, remember the admonishment of the 19th Komsomol Congress: "It is the sacred duty of each Komsomol member and each young person to strengthen the defense might of the USSR and to unfailingly carry out the USSR Law "Governing Universal Military Service."⁸

The young patriots in deed are showing that the modern military equipment and weapons entrusted to them are in reliable hands. According to the results of the winter training period, one out of every two Navy Komsomol member is an outstanding man in military and political training and 75 percent of the Komsomol members are rated athletes and holders of the insignia of the All-Union Sports Complex.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], "Sbornik prikazov RVS" [Collection of RVS Orders], 1922, No 22408.
2. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 10, 1978, p 8.
3. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 200.
4. TsA VLKSM [Komsomol Central Archives], folio 1, inv. 5, file 206, sheet 16.
5. [Not in text]
6. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 10, 1978, p 9.
7. PRAVDA, 19 May 1982.
8. KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 22 May 1982.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARTILLERY MARSHAL K. R. KAZAKOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 82 (signed to press 27 Sep 82) pp 92-94

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar SU P. Batitskiy: "Mar Arty K. P. Kazakov; On the Occasion of His 80th Birthday"]

[Text] My first meeting with Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov* occurred on a day in September 1939 when I was on an official mission to China. He had arrived in the city of Chongquing with a group of Soviet military advisers for helping the Chinese people who were fighting against the Japanese invaders. The chief military adviser A. N. Bogolyubov introduced us to the new representative of the USSR. In the course of a lively discussion, it became clear that Konstatin Petrovich was highly erudite and possessed good military training. Subsequently, these qualities of his were fully confirmed. As an artilleryman, he successfully solved the questions of organizing artillery fire control and the instructing of the Chinese commanders in artillery skills. K. P. Kazakov also smoothly and confidently handled other tasks. He not only instructed the Chinese soldiers, but also took a personal part in repelling enemy attacks.

K. P. Kazakov has led an interesting and eventful life. He was born on 18 November 1902 in the family of a worker from the Tula Ordnance Plant. By family tradition, at the age of 13 he began working at this enterprise, initially as an apprentice and later as a machinist. In January 1919, he joined the Komsomol and in March of the following year was admitted to the party. In 1921, under a party mobilization, Konstantin Petrovich was sent to study in the Military United School imeni VTsIK. Having completed it in 1923, he served in the artillery units. Initially he was a platoon commander and later a battery and battalion commander. After completing his studies at the end of 1939 in the artillery courses for the advanced training of middle-level command personnel, he was appointed a battery commander and later a battalion commander of the Military United School imeni VTsIK. In this school Konstantin Petrovich successfully proved himself in teaching and gave the artillery course. After completing the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze in 1936, he taught at the Second Moscow Artillery School and later headed the tactics series in this same school.

When the Great Patriotic War started, K. P. Kazakov was the commander of the 331st Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the RGK [High Command Reserve] stationed on the

* For more information about K. P. Kazakov, see also VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1972, pp 121-128.

territory of the Kiev Special Military District. Under combat conditions, the artillery troops from the unit assigned to him fought courageously against the Nazis as part of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front. Just during the period from 17 through 27 July 1941, they destroyed 48 tanks, 200 vehicles, 14 artillery batteries and much other military equipment.

K. P. Kazakov successfully evidenced his organizational abilities in staff work as well. In February 1942, he was appointed chief of the operations section on the artillery staff of the Southwestern Front and in April of the same year headed the operations section on the staff of the Main Directorate of the Artillery Chief of the Soviet Army. Konstantin Petrovich devoted a great deal of strength and energy to organizing the artillery units and formations, particularly the antitank ones. In knowing command and staff work well, he took part in working out the offensive operations conducted by the troops on the left wing of the Western Front.

A particular page in the military biography of Konstantin Petrovich is his part in the Battle of Stalingrad as part of the operations group of officers from the artillery staff of the Soviet Army which was headed by Col Gen Arty (from January 1943, Mar Arty) N. N. Voronov. During the defensive engagements, K. P. Kazakov provided substantial help to the artillery staffs of the formations and field forces in planning and carrying out effective counterpreparations and in organizing the most effective artillery grouping. In the course of the counteroffensive, the artillery offensive was prepared and carried out with the full involvement of Konstantin Petrovich. In possessing a broad operational viewpoint, he creatively analyzed the successes and failings in the combat employment of the artillery, he generalized the combat experience and worked out new procedures for employing this branch of troops.

In 1944, Konstantin Petrovich was returned to line service. At the beginning of July, he assumed the position of artillery commander of the 2d Assault Army of the Leningrad Front. By this time, the troops of the field force, having crushed the strong Nazi fortifications at Ropsha, Oranienbaum and Petergof, had captured Kingisepp and seized a bridgehead on the Narva River. For liberating the heavily fortified center of resistance, the town of Narva, upon the instructions of the army commander, in the field force two strong artillery groupings were set up making it possible to bring the gun and mortar density up to 200-210 units per kilometer of front in the breakthrough area on the main sector. In the aim of countering the enemy artillery, a counterbattery bombardment group was also organized.

An important role was played by the army artillery in the liberating of the remaining territory of Estonia. For example, due to the skillfully executed regrouping, its density on individual breakthrough areas in the Tallinn sector reached 220-230 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

After the successful conclusion of the offensive operation to liberate the capital of Estonia, Tallinn, the 2d Assault Army was shifted to the Second Belorussian Front where it participated in the East Prussian, Eastern Pomeranian and Berlin Operations. In the course of these operations, under the leadership of K. P. Kazakov, extensive work was carried out in the concealed concentration and deployment of the artillery in preparing for the offensive. Konstantin Petrovich showed initiative and ability in the battles for the fortress and town of Graudenz. For supporting the advancing infantry, upon his instructions, two large artillery groups were moved up for direct

laying and a large army artillery group was organized for destroying the enemy firing installations in the town and fortress.

In speaking as a whole about the combat activities of K. P. Kazakov during the years of the Great Patriotic War, it is essential to point out that he always endeavored to utilize the artillery efficiently, carrying out a broad and rapid maneuver of the units and formations and massing artillery fire on the most important sectors. He devoted much attention to organizing artillery reconnaissance and supplying ammunition to the artillery units and formations.

After the end of the war against Nazi Germany, K. P. Kazakov was appointed the artillery commander of the 1st Red Banner Army which was preparing to carry out the Harbin-Girin Operation as part of the First Far Eastern Front. Under his leadership, under the conditions of a difficult theater of war, the artillery of the field force successfully carried out the task of fire neutralization of the enemy.

In the postwar years, having completed the Higher Academy Courses under the Military Academy of the General Staff, Konstantin Petrovich commanded the artillery of a number of military districts and groups of forces.

In 1954, he headed the antiaircraft missile troops and the antiaircraft artillery of the National Air Defense Troops and devoted a great deal of energy and labor to the training of the officer personnel and shaping up the units.

From March 1963 through 1969, K. P. Kazakov was the commander of the rocket forces and artillery of the Ground Forces. In this position he devoted all his energy to the development of the rocket troops, to working out their combat employment in combat and an operation and to improving new models of artillery ordnance and antitank guided missiles.

In 1969, K. P. Kazakov was appointed to the position of military inspector and adviser to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He made a worthy contribution to strengthening the defense might of our Armed Forces and to the military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet Army personnel and the youth.

Konstantin Petrovich has also published. He has written the books "Vsegda s pekhotoy, vsegda s tankami," [Always with the Infantry, Always with the Tanks] and "Artilleriyskiy grom" [The Roar of Artillery].

For combat achievements and able leadership of the artillery, he has been awarded three Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Kutuzov, First and Second Degrees, two Orders of Suvorov, Second Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy First Degree, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces" Third Degree, many medals as well as foreign orders.

Konstantin Petrovich was elected a delegate to the 23d CPSU Congress and has been a deputy of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet.

We wish Konstantin Petrovich good health, personal happiness and successes in his activities for the good of our socialist motherland and its Armed Forces.

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